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1. INTRODUCTION
The violent demonstrations and riots at the ministerial
conference of the World Trade Organization ("WTO")1 in Seattle 2
have helped draw attention not only to the organization itself (the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ["GATT"] and the WTO
probably received more publicity during that one week in
December 1999 than during its more than fifty odd years of
existence), but also to the WTO's potential to serve as a tool for the
harmonization of domestic policies in a variety of fields, many of
which are only remotely connected to international trade. Since
the protesters were made up of a ragbag of different groups -
including trade unionists, environmentalists, aid lobbyists,
consumer-rights campaigners, human-rights activists, and outright
anarchists - each group has a different and sometimes
* Dr. Arie Reich; LL.B. (Israel), LL.M., S.J.D. (University of Toronto); Vice
Dean, Faculty of Law, Bar Ilan University, Israel. E-Mail: reicha@mail.biu.ac.il. I
wish to thank the participants of the 9th Conference of the International Academy
of Commercial and Consumer Law, as well as the participants of the Law Faculty
Seminar of the Bar Ilan University, where earlier versions of this research were
presented and received helpful comments, especially from my colleague Oren
Perez.
1 The World Trade Organization ("WTO") was established in 1994 as a
multilateral organization aimed at providing a common institutional framework
for the conduct of trade relations among its members-that today number about
148-in matters relating to the agreements and associated legal instruments
included in the same 1994 package. The most important of these agreements is
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), which in essence
originates in an agreement by the same name signed in 1947. Prior to the
establishment of the WTO, the institutional framework set up around the GA'T
and several other side-agreements negotiated under its auspices, served as a semi-
organization performing many of the functions that the WTO now performs. See
also infra note 13.
2 See Robert Collier, Turmoil in Seattle Streets, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 1, 1999, at Al;
The Battle in Seattle, ECONOMIST, Nov. 27, 1999 (U.S. ed.) [hereinafter Battle in
Seattle].
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
contradicting agenda.3 This observation may not be obvious at
first glance, but taken one-by-one it will become more apparent.
The trade unionists, for example, are traditional opponents of
trade liberalization, particularly in declining labour-intensive
industries that can survive only under the protection of high tariffs
or generous subsidies in the face of mounting competition from
low-wage developing countries. But they did not take to the
streets of Seattle to demand that consumers and taxpayers continue
to subsidize their jobs and high wages. Rather, the trade unionists
spoke of the need to guarantee higher labour standards in the
developing countries -standards more commensurate to those
required in the rich and developed countries of the West. Their
argument may have taken the form of an altruistic human rights
concern, in particular when raising issues such as child labour and
subhuman working conditions, but more self-centered concerns
about the cost advantage enjoyed by producers in countries with
low labour standards lie in the background. This cost advantage
may injure both producers and workers in the high-standard
country, and thereby also increase opposition to any further rise in
those standards. The trade unions of such countries therefore
demand that the WTO permit its "Member States" to employ trade
restrictions against imports from other Member States whose
labour policies do not meet certain basic standards. This would
then serve as a means to compel these states to improve their
labour standards and to harmonize them with what is accepted in
the developed countries -or perhaps with some core standards
that are to be set by the WTO or some other international
organization (the International Labour Organization ["ILO"], in
particular).
The same applies to the environmentalists. Their animosity
towards international trade agreements originated in the early
nineties when a GATT panel ruled that the United States could not
employ trade sanctions in order to impose its own standards of
dolphin protection on the rest of the world.4 It then gained further
steam in connection with the North American Free Trade
3 Battle in Seattle, supra note 2. See W. Russell Mead, World Trade Organization;
Skewered in Seattle; In the Suites and on the Streets, Few Agreed, L. A. TIMEs, Dec. 5,
1999, at Mi.
4 See United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Sept. 3, 1991, GATT
B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 (1991) [hereinafter United States Restrictions on
Imports of Tuna] (stating that a U.S. embargo on certain foreign tuna was an
unjustifiable discrimination).
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Agreement ("NAFTA") negotiations, 5 when they feared that free
trade with a country with low environmental standards such as
Mexico would lead to a massive flight of U.S. and Canadian
industries to south of the Rio Grande, where they would be exempt
from the burdensome and expensive environmental regulations of
the northern nations. In both cases, the international trade regimes
were called upon to facilitate harmonization of environmental
standards between the trading nations.
A diametric argument-namely against the harmonizing
function of the WTO-was also surprisingly represented among
the somewhat peculiar alliance of demonstrators. Behind the
catchy slogan "The WTO kills people. Kill the WTO" that appeared
on many banners in Seattle, 6 stands a serious criticism of the
standards of intellectual property protection claimed to have been
forced upon developing countries by the WTO's Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS
Agreement"), concluded in the Uruguay Round of 1994.7 The
critics argued that as a result of the agreement the price of essential
drugs will skyrocket in many developing countries and become
unavailable for a large part of the poor population who needs them
most.
Seen from whatever angle, the issue of divergent national
standards and rules, and the prospect of harmonizing them in
connection with the world's international trade regime, appears to
have become a central motif of the WTO.
The central argument of this Article is that the WTO is
emerging as a major player in the field of global harmonization of
national laws. Usually, when we think of institutions that deal
with and promote harmonization of law, we think of organizations
such as the International Institute for the Unification of Private
Law ("UNIDROIT"),8 the United Nations Commission on
5 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1991, 32 I.L.M. 289, 289-605
(1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
6 Battle in Seattle, supra note 2.
7 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Dec.
15, 1993, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Agreement, Annex
1C, 33 I.L.M. 81 (April 1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]. The TRIPS Agreement is further
discussed infra Section 3.
8 The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law
("UNIDROIT") is an independent inter-governmental organization with its seat in
Rome. Its purpose is to examine ways of harmonizing and coordinating the
private law of States and of groups of States, and to gradually prepare for the
adoption by States of uniform rules of private law. It was established in 1926 as
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International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL"),9 or even non-
governmental organizations ("NGOs"), such as the International
Chamber of Commerce ("ICC").10 The WTO, in contrast, is usually
perceived of as an organization whose mandate is to lower
artificial trade barriers between nations -such as custom tariffs,
quotas, and other border measures-and not as an organization
that attempts to harmonize national policies, such as domestic
commercial laws. That perception of the GATT/WTO- as shown
in this Article- was basically correct in the past, at the outset of the
GATT regime, but it is not accurate anymore.
This Article will examine the harmonizing function of the
WTO, first historically, and then prospectively, in an attempt to
map the areas of law where potential exists for harmonization
within the WTO. This Article will demonstrate that while the
GATT regime did not deal with law originally, nor was it very
keen to use law as a means to achieve its objectives, it has
gradually had to change its focus-not only by embracing law in
the latter sense (as has been widely discussed in the literature), 11
but also by viewing domestic law as part of its subject matter. This
Article will show that this shift in perspective opens up wide
horizons for new harmonization initiatives that were unthinkable
an auxiliary organ of the League of Nations and later, following the demise of the
League, re-established in 1940 on the basis of a multilateral agreement, the
UNIDROIT Statute. It has currently 58 Member States. See generally UNIDROIT
website, at http://www.unidroit.org (last visited Feb. 26, 2004).
9 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") is
the core legal body within the United Nations system in the field of international
trade law. It was established in 1966 by the General Assembly with the mandate
to further the progressive harmonization and unification of the law of
international trade. Its seat is in Vienna. See UNCITRAL's official website, at
http://www.uncitral.org (last visited Feb. 26, 2004).
10 The International Chamber of Commerce ("ICC"), seated in Paris, was
founded in 1919 as a worldwide association of merchants and business
organizations. Today it groups thousands of member companies and associations
from over 130 countries. It has initiated and promoted several sets of uniform
rules that govern the conduct of business across borders. Although these rules are
voluntary, they have been widely accepted by merchants and banks, and even
courts of law, and have become part of the fabric of international trade. See ICC
official website, at http://www.iccwbo.org (last visited Feb. 26, 2004).
11 See generally Thomas J. Dillon, Jr., The World Trade Organization: A New Legal
Order for World Trade?, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 349 (1995) (discussing the innovations
and problems of the new dispute resolution and settlement mechanisms of the
WTO); Arie Reich, From Diplomacy to Law: The Juridicization of International Trade
Relations, 17 Nw. J. INT'L. L. & Bus. 775 (1996-1997) (discussing how trade relations
of GATT members are being adjudicated).
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just a few years ago, both within the GATT and, in many cases,
elsewhere, as well. The last part of the Article examines the
institutional advantages and disadvantages of an organization, like
the WTO, assuming the role of a law-harmonizing institution, in
comparison to the bodies that hitherto have been performing this
role, and suggests ways in which the WTO could improve its
working and negotiating procedures in order to better fulfill its
new role.
2. THE TRADITIONAL NON-HARMONIZING APPROACH OF THE
GATT
Unlike the Treaty Establishing the European Community
("EEC Treaty"),12 the GATT,13 which until today serves as the
foundation of the WTO, does not list harmonization of the national
laws or domestic policies of its signatories as one of its objectives.
In fact, the traditional policy of the multilateral trade regime was to
distance itself from anything that would appear as an intervention
in the internal affairs of its signatories. Its mandate was to
contribute to "the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers
to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in
international commerce." 1
4
For that purpose, two main types of trade measures were the
targets of the GATT: (1) border measures and (2) internal
measures that discriminate between domestic and foreign products
or between products sold abroad and those sold domestically.
Border measures can be divided into tariffs and non-tariff barriers
12 See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, Mar. 25,
1957, art. 3, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, at 47-49 (1957) [hereinafter EEC TREATY], (listing
among the activities of the Community, in addition to the elimination of customs
duties and quantitative restrictions on the import and export of goods, the
establishment of a common commercial policy, a common policy in the sphere of
agriculture and fisheries and in the sphere of transport, and "the approximation
of the laws of Member States to the extent required for the functioning of the
common market.").
13 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter GATT]. The GATT was originally put into effect pursuant to the
Protocol of Provisional Application of the GATT, 55 U.N.T.S. 308. Today it is
incorporated into the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization pursuant to its Article II. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1944) [hereinafter WTO
Agreement], reprinted in LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
VOL. 6 (1994) [hereinafter RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND].
14 GATT, id. at 196.
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to trade. Tariffs are tolerated as such by GATT, but are subject to
multilateral negotiations between the signatories, aimed at
reducing them gradually and reciprocally and in accordance with
the Most Favored Nation ("MFN") principle.'5 Any other border
restrictions against imports or exports (other than duties, taxes or
other charges), "whether made effective through quotas, import or
export licenses or other measures," are in principle prohibited.' 6
As for internal measures, these are governed by the National
Treatment principle, which forbids discrimination between
domestic and imported products. 17 What is common to these two
types of prohibited measures is that both serve as artificial barriers
to the free flow of international trade and as means of protection
for domestic producers, and are usually introduced precisely for
those purposes. In other words, they are usually measures of
international trade policy, and not domestic policies.18 In principle,
a GATT signatory is entitled to adopt any domestic policy it finds
fit, as long as it applies to both domestic and foreign products alike
and does not discriminate against foreign products based on their
origin. Hence, at least in the beginning, there were no aspirations
to harmonize or approximate national domestic policies-even
though the differences in these policies often served in themselves
as barriers to the free flow of international trade.
This point is amply illustrated by one of the first cases of the
WTO dispute settlement system-United States- Standards for
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline19-which was litigated
mainly under provisions originating from the 1947 General
Agreement. It was also one of the many cases that prompted
criticism from the environmental community, who saw the WTO
Panel's ruling, which was aimed against certain provisions of the
15 See id. arts. I (General Most Favored Nation Treatment), XXVIII
(Modification of Schedules), and XXVIII (Tariff Negotiations).
16 Id. art. XI:I (general elimination of quantitative restrictions).
17 Id. art. III (national treatment of internal taxation and regulations).
18 See Frieder Roessler, Diverging Domestic Policies and Multilateral Trade
Integration, in 2 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITE FOR FREE TRADE? 21
(J. Bhagwati et al. eds., 1996).
19 WTO Panel Report on the United States -Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/R (Jan. 29, 1996), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/dispu-statuse.htm#1996 (last
visited Feb. 16, 2004); WTO Appellate Body Report, United States -Standards for
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996)
[hereinafter Appellate Report], available at http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop-e/dispue/distabasee.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2004).
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U.S. Federal Clean Air Act of 1990, as interfering with the United
States' domestic environmental policy. In fact, the Panel did not
rule against the legitimacy of the Act itself. Nor did it rule against
the right of any WTO member to determine its own environmental
policies 20 - even if these are materially different from those of other
members and consequently make it harder for other members to
export their gasoline to such a member. What the Panel did rule
against was the failure of the United States to live up to its
obligation under Article 111:4 of GATT, to accord to imported
gasoline no less favourable treatment than that accorded to like
gasoline of U.S. origin. The Panel found that under the
implementing rules of the Act, imported gasoline was effectively
prevented from benefiting from the same favourable sales
conditions as were afforded domestic gasoline, and therefore
imported gasoline was treated less favourably than domestic
gasoline. While it had been acknowledged in previous panel
decisions that in certain cases one may be allowed to treat domestic
and imported products formally differently (because of the different
circumstances surrounding their entry into the market), the different
treatment may not be qualitatively less favourable than that accorded
to the domestic product. This was held to mean that products may
not be accorded competitive opportunities that are less favourable.
21
However, as long as this standard was met, Member States were free
to introduce whatever domestic regulations they wished, even if
such regulations - because of their peculiarity - might impair the
export opportunities of their trading partners. Article III-as it was
held in a 1988 panel report-could not be interpreted to protect
expectations on export volumes.
22
This approach is, of course, much different from the one taken
by the EEC Treaty and the European Court of Justice. There, even
an equally applicable measure may be prohibited by the treaty rules
if it effectively causes obstacles to the free movement of goods.
Thus, in the famous case of Cassis de Dijon,23 a German law laying
down a minimum alcohol level of 25% for certain spirits- local and
20 See Appellate Report, supra note 19, at 30 (concluding words of the
appellate body).
21 United States Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, Nov. 7, 1989, GATT
B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 386, para. 5.11 (1990).
22 United States Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, June
17, 1987, GATT B.I.S.D. (34th Supp.) at 158, para. 5.1.9 (1988).
23 Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur
Branntwein (hereinafter Cassis de Dijon), 1979 E.C.R. 649.
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foreign alike-could be declared illegal, because it effectively banned
French cassis (which traditionally has an alcohol content of 15-20%)
from the German market. Once French cassis enters the German
market, it will, as a practical matter, be very difficult for the German
authorities to maintain the prohibition against the German
production of similar spirits with lower alcohol levels. Thus, the
European approach, besides dismantling more barriers to trade, no
doubt also has a harmonizing effect on the European Member States
that is lacking in the traditional GATT regime.
A similar trend can be found in the GATT approach to
subsidies. From a purely economic standpoint, a subsidy granted
to a product that is exported to another country will cause the
same amount of distortion, as well as hardship for competing
producers, regardless of whether the subsidy is conferred upon
exportation alone, or upon the plant's entire production. In both
cases, the price of the product is not likely to reflect the real
competitive advantage of the producer in question, and may
therefore distort the market mechanism. Nevertheless, until the
Uruguay Round, only export subsidies were prohibited under
GATT or under one of its side agreements, while other subsidies
were largely tolerated. Thus, under GATT Article XVI, while it is
recognized that various types of subsidies may operate to increase
exports or to reduce imports, and may thereby cause "serious
prejudice" to the interest of any other contracting party, this in
itself did not result in any prohibition on such subsidies.24 It was
only in relation to subsidies on the export of primary products25
that the Agreement used restrictive language, such as "seek to
avoid" (in general) and "shall not" (in relation to subsidies which
result in a contracting party having more than an "equitable share"
of world export trade in that product).26 Even in the more far-
reaching agreement of the 1979 Tokyo Round, an outright
prohibition was only imposed on export subsidies conferred upon
industrial products. 27 And why not upon all subsidies that distort
24 See GATT, supra note 13, art. XVI, para. 1.
25 A "primary product" in this context is defined as "any product of farm,
forest or fishery, or any mineral .... See id. art. XVI.
26 See id.
27 See Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and
XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Sept. 14, 1973, GATT
B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 68, art.9 (1979) (this agreement is commonly referred to as
the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code). "Export subsidies" are considered as such
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international trade? It was apparently felt that this would be too
much of an intrusion into domestic matters. If a contracting party
chose to confer subsidies upon an entire domestic industry-both on
production for the domestic market as well as for export-this was
seen as a matter of internal socio-economic policies with which
GATT should not interfere. Thus, GATT did not strive to harmonize
the national policies of its signatories even when such policies may
have caused considerable distortion of international trade.
3. GATT's GRADUAL ASSUMPTION OF THE HARMONIZATION ROLE
The transformation of the GATT/WTO regime into a system
which features not only elimination of artificial trade barriers, but
also harmonization of domestic policies, was not a sharp shift that
happened overnight, but rather a gradual evolutionary process,
which is still only in its initial stages. At first, the harmonization of
certain rules and procedures was simply a by-product of the need to
eliminate straightforward trade barriers. Gradually, however, the
harmonizing measures were deliberately expanded so as to affect
pure domestic policies and rules.
3.1. Antidumping and Countervailing Duties
Take, for example, GATT's evolving regulation of the way
national authorities must administer the imposition of antidumping
and countervailing duties. Its origin, in Article VI of the 1947
General Agreement, merely sets out the basic conditions for the
contracting parties' right to impose such duties.28 One must keep in
mind that the imposition of any import duty in excess of a party's
bound tariff on a particular product is generally prohibited under
GATT. Antidumping countervailing duties are an exception to this
rule. It is therefore clear that this exception needs to be carefully
restricted in order to prevent its abuse. Indeed, the legalistic
producer-induced mechanism of antidumping or countervailing
duty proceedings soon became an extremely attractive option for
industries threatened by inexpensive imports, and turned into a
widely exploited venue for circumventing the general rule
when they are bestowed contingent, in law or in fact, upon export performance.
28 GATT, supra note 13, art. VI.
329
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prohibiting import duties.29 It soon became clear that the GATT
basic rules were not sufficient and that more stringent and detailed
rules were required. The first step in this direction was taken with
the 1967 Antidumping Code,30 which set out some minimal
procedural standards for antidumping proceedings. The regulation
efforts continued with the 1979 Tokyo Round Antidumping Code,31
and in the course of the Uruguay Round, the currently prevailing
Antidumping Agreement was concluded.32 The provisions of these
agreements, and in particular of the last one, go into very meticulous
details of both the substantive and procedural aspects of
antidumping proceedings. The agreement defines what is
considered to be dumping, how one should go about computing the
various components of the dumping calculations, and what needs to
be investigated for the purpose of determining whether or not injury
has been caused by the dumping. The almost thirty-page-long
agreement also meticulously sets out all the procedural and
evidentiary requirements that must be met throughout the
proceedings: from the stage of the submission of a complaint on
behalf of a domestic industry; through the initiation of an
investigation, due process and hearing; until the decision whether or
not to impose an antidumping duty. It deals with the provisional
measures that may be applied and the conditions that have to be
met in order to apply them. It even goes into questions regarding
periodical reviews of the cases, as well as to Members' duty to
provide judicial review. Almost identical procedural provisions can
be found in the countervailing duty section of the Uruguay Round
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. 33
29 See ANTIDUMPING, How IT WORKS AND WHO GETS HURT a. Michael Finger
ed., 1993); C.D. HOWE INST., FAIR EXCHANGE: REFORMING TRADE REMEDY LAWS (M.J.
Trebilcock & R.C. York eds., 1990).
30 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, May 21, 1963, 651 U.N.T.S. 320, GATT B.I.S.D. (15th Supp.) at 24
(1968).
31 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp) at 171 (1980).
32 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994 [hereinafter 1994 Antidumping Agreement], reprinted in
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 13, at 168, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legal-e/19-adp.pdf (last visited Feb. 26,
2004).
33 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Part IV [hereinafter
1994 Subsidies Agreement], reprinted in RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, supra
note 13, at 264, 273, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/24-
scm.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2004).
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These detailed agreements do not leave very much leeway for
national regulation, and as a result, the antidumping and
countervailing duty legislation of most WTO members is quite
similar.34 Of course, a Member State is not required to adopt any
such legislation if it chooses not to avail itself of antidumping or
countervailing duties. But if it does -and over the past few years
more and more states have done so 35 -it must ensure that its laws,
regulations, and administrative procedures are in conformity with
the provisions of the relevant WTO agreements. 36 Indeed, the many
developing countries that have introduced trade remedy laws since
the Uruguay Round have all fashioned their laws in accordance with
the detailed provisions of these agreements, and in many cases have
simply translated them into their own language and adopted them
into law.37 The harmonizing effect of these WTO instruments is
therefore compelling, even though their original objective was not to
harmonize but to prevent abuse.
34 This is not to say that the laws of all WTO members in this regard are
identical. There are many issues that the WTO agreements have left to the
discretion of the Members, such as whether to adopt the "lesser duty rule" and
whether to conduct inquiries of "community (or national) interest," to name only
a few contentious examples. There are also issues that the agreements have not
dealt with, such as anti-circumvention measures and institutional aspects of the
investigations and determinations. In relation to these issues and aspects we will,
of course, find differences between the various national regimes. In relation to
most aspects, however, the legal regimes are very similar.
35 The last few years have seen a sharp rise in the use of antidumping
measures, in particular by new users in the developing countries, who in the past
did not have any antidumping legislation in place. See Jorge Miranda, et al., The
International Use of Antidumping: 1987-1997, 32 J. WORLD TRADE, 5-71 (1998);
Antidumping Goes Global, Bus. TODAY (Oct. 30, 1998).
36 See 1994 Antidumping Agreement, supra note 32, art. 18; 1994 Subsidies
Agreement, supra note 33, art. 32.
37 For a detailed survey of the situation in the countries of Central and South-
America, see Organization of American States, Trade Unit, Compendium of
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws in the Western Hemisphere (1997),
available at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/WGroups/WGADCVD/english/toc.asp.
The survey reports that most of the countries of North, Central and South
America have incorporated the provisions of these two agreements into their
national legislation. Israel has also incorporated whole parts of the agreements (in
particular all the provisions on determination of injury) into the bill that is now
pending for the amendment of the existing trade remedy law-The Trade Charges
Law, 5751-1991. See generally Arie Reich, Institutional and Substantive Reform of the
Antidumping Agreement: Lessons from the Israeli Experience, J. WORLD TRADE, Dec.
2003.
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
3.2. Customs Administration
The same pattern can be found in relation to the entire regime of
customs administration. While GATT started off concentrating
mainly on the rates of customs, it soon had to devote more attention
and energy to the way customs are administered and assessed, as
well as to other formalities and fees connected with importation and
exportation. In addition to the basic provisions of the GATT in this
regard,38 we now have several additional agreements within the
WTO regime that deal with these issues in detail and which have the
cumulative effect of harmonizing the customs and importation laws
of all WTO members.39 The frequent tariff negotiations between
GATT/WTO members, and the need to provide statistical data on
trade flows that is comparable between these members were also
instrumental in promoting another important harmonization
project-the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding
System ("Harmonized System") - developed by the Custom
Cooperation Council ("CCC") in 1983.40 Over time all major GATT
members have made this uniform system the basis of their customs
classification systems.
A further step towards harmonization in this field was taken
with the Uruguay Round Agreement on Rules of Origin.41 One of
the express objectives of this agreement is to harmonize the rules of
origin used by all WTO members in connection with imports
38 See GATT, supra note 13, arts. VII, VIII.
39 In particular: the Custom Valuation Agreement [formally known as the
Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1994], reprinted in RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 13, at
197, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/20-val.pdf;
Agreement on Preshipment Inspection, reprinted in RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND, supra note 13, at 230, available at http://www.wto.org/english/
docs-e/legal-e/21-psi.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2004); Agreement on Import
Licensing Procedures, reprinted in RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 13,
at 255, available at http://www.wto.org/english/ docs-e/legal e/23-lics.pdf (last
visited Feb. 26, 2004).
40 International Convention on the Harmonized Commodity Description and
Coding System, June 14, 1983, 1035 U.N.T.S. 3.
41 Agreement on Rules of Origin, reprinted in RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND, supra note 13, at 241, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/
legal-e/22-roo.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2004). "Rules of origin" are the criteria
used to define where a product was made. They are an essential part of trade
rules and import administration because a number of policies discriminate
between exporting countries: Most Favored Nation ("MFN") tariffs (not always
granted to non-members of the WTO), quotas, preferential tariffs, antidumping
actions, countervailing duties, government procurement, and more.
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coming under the WTO agreements. 42 Until now, countries have
used different rules with different criteria to determine the origin of
certain goods, leading sometimes to severe problems of
incompatibility as well as the use of the rules as disguised barriers to
international trade.43 For this purpose, the agreement establishes a
set of guiding principles that are to serve as the basis for a work
program that is to be undertaken by the WTO's Ministerial
Conference in conjunction with the CCC. The work, scheduled to be
completed by July 1998, turned out to be more complicated than
anticipated, and required several time extensions. Nevertheless, it
appears that it has by now been largely completed except for a few
outstanding issues.44
Needless to say, the harmonizing effect in this and other fields is
increasing significantly as the number of members of the
GATT/WTO system rises steadily over time, and in particular
because many of the previously voluntary side agreements have
become mandatory as a result of the Uruguay Round.45
3.3. Government Procurement Law
Another agreement within the GATF/WTO framework that has
had an important harmonizing effect on its signatories' laws and
procedures is the Agreement on Government Procurement
("AGP").46 This agreement, which was first promulgated in the
course of the Tokyo Round that ended in 1979, and later by a more
extensive agreement following the Uruguay Round in 1994, deals
42 See id. (seeking to harmonize and clarify rules of origin).
43 See, e.g., Norio Komuro, International Harmonization of Rules of Origin, in THE
WTO AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION 86 (P. Rutley et al. eds., 1998).
44 Press Brief, WTO, Rules of Origin, at http://www.wto.org/english/
thewto-e/minist-e/min96_e/rules.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2003).
45 The "Custom Valuation Code," for instance, was already in existence after
the Tokyo Round, but had only some twenty signatories at the time. See GATT
Secretariat, The Texts of Tokyo Round Agreements, GATT/1986-5 (1986) [hereinafter
Tokyo Round]. Following the Uruguay Round, this agreement became part of the
"single undertaking" and thereby binds all current WTO members. See Custom
Valuation Agreement, supra note 39.
46 Agreement on Government Procurement, Tokyo Round, supra note 45, at 27.
For the Agreement on Government Procurement that was reached in the Uruguay
Round that superceded the prior agreement, see Agreement on Government
Procurement, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 4 [hereinafter Uruguay Round AGP], reprinted in RESULTS OF
THE URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 13, at 438, available at http://www.wto.org/eng
lish/tratope/gproc-e/agrmnt e.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2004).
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with laws, regulations, procedures, and practices of government
purchasing.47 Again, the objective of the AGP is not to harmonize
this important field of law, but rather to liberalize and expand trade
in the public sector by eliminating preferential treatment of domestic
suppliers and products and ensuring fair and open international
competition for government contracts. However, it was soon
realized that this objective could not be achieved solely by
prohibiting discrimination. What was needed was a detailed
procedural regime that would prescribe rules on tendering
procedures and contract award criteria. The AGP therefore adopted
such a regime, which in its content strongly resembled what you
would expect to find in any national legislation regulating
government tendering and contracting. It includes detailed rules on
how government tenders must be conducted, how and where they
should be advertised, how qualification of suppliers should be
conducted, how to use technical specifications, and how to conduct
selection procedures. It prescribes minimum time limits for
tendering and delivery; as well as the information that must be
contained in the tender documentation; and lays down rules on how
the submission, receipt and opening of tenders should be conducted;
and how the awarding of contracts should be made. It even requires
its parties to provide judicial or quasi-judicial challenge procedures
whereby an aggrieved supplier can bring a complaint against a
procuring agency in case of breach of any of the AGP provision and
prescribes certain standards that such procedures must meet.48
The AGP has clearly had a harmonizing effect on the
government procurement law of its signatories (which do not
include all the members of the WTO).49 They have had to amend
their laws and regulations in this field to conform to the AGP
provisions.50 Many of them have also had to set up specialized
administrative tribunals to hear bid protests and challenges or to
amend their laws so as to allow judicial review by their regular
47 For an extensive discussion of these agreements, see ARIE REICH,
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC PROCUREMENT LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL
REGIMES ON PUBLIC PURCHASING 103-140, 279-318 (1999).
48 See Uruguay Round AGP, supra note 46, at art. XX.
49 The AGP has the status of a "plurilateral" agreement, and is not a part of
the "single undertaking," which binds all the current 148 members of the WTO.
The parties to the AGP are mainly developed industrialized countries, such as the
United States, Canada, Japan, the European Union Member States, and other
Western European countries, all in all, twenty or so states.
50 See Uruguay Round AGP, supra note 46, art. XXIV.
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courts. Consequently, as of today, the law of government tendering
and contracting in AGP countries is much more uniform than it
would have been in the absence of the AGP.
In the existing literature on the AGP, this aspect has gone
almost unnoticed. The reason is that harmonization, as we noted
earlier, was never an official objective of the agreement. It is,
however, a byproduct with many blessings. In addition to
compelling many states to introduce clear, transparent, and truly
competitive rules of tendering that prevent not only domestic
protectionism, but also corrupt favouritism, the greater uniformity
between the national systems also makes it easier for suppliers to
participate in the market for foreign government contracts.
Evidence of the AGP's harmonizing function can be found if
we compare it to the parallel liberalization instruments of the
European Community ("EC"). These instruments, the public
procurement directives that were adopted first in the seventies and
then later as part of the "Europe 1992" program,51 served as a
model for the AGP, both in the Tokyo Round and in the Uruguay
Round.52 Hence, both the structure and contents of the AGP are
very similar to those found in these instruments. However, the
harmonizing function in the AGP is concealed, while it is explicit
51 The first coordination directive was Council Directive 71/305 of July 26,
1971, 1971 O.J. (L 185) 5 (relating to the coordination of procedures for the award
of public works contracts). It was followed by Council Directive 77/62 of
December 21, 1976, 1977 O.J. (L 13) 1 (coordinating procedures for the award of
public supply contracts). These two directives were amended and considerably
strengthened in the late eighties. See Council Directive 88/295, 1988 O.J. (L 127) 1
(amending Directive 77/62 in March 1988, relating to the coordination of
procedures on the award of public supply contracts and repealing certain
provisions of Directive 80/767); Council Directive 89/440, 1989 O.J. (L 210) 1
(amending Directive 71/305 in July 1989, concerning coordination of procedures
for the award of public works contracts. Then additional directives were imposed
the tendering regime also on entities operating in the water, energy, transport and
telecommunication sectors (so-called public utilities). See Council Directive
90/531 [hereinafter Council Directive 90/531], 1990 O.J. (L 297) 1 (concerning the
procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and
telecommunications sectors); Council Directive 92/50, 1992 O.J. (L 209) 1 (relating
to the coordination of procedures for the award of public service contracts).
52 See REICH, supra note 47, at 109, 279; Morton Pomeranz, Toward a New
International Order in Government Procurement, 11 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1263,
1263-1300 (1979) (tracing the remarkable policy developments represented by the
AGP); Gerard de Graaf & Matthew King, Toward a More Global Government
Procurement Market: The Expansion of the GATT Government Procurement Agreement
in the Context of the Uruguay Round, 29 INT'L LAW. 435, 435-452 (1995) (discussing
the importance of European Community measures in influencing subsequent
agreements, namely the AGP).
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in the EC directives. The directives are adopted with the objective
of "coordinating" the procedures for the award of public contracts
(not just to "liberalize and expand trade in the public sector"). Also
among the authorizing provisions of the EEC Treaty referred to in
the preambles are provisions whose express objective is "the
approximation of laws" and "the achievement of uniformity."5 3
Given the similarity of the AGP to the directives, it is clear that it too
serves to achieve approximation of laws and greater uniformity
among its parties.
3.4. Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
One Uruguay Round Agreement that expressly mentions
harmonization as one of its objectives is the Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (the "SPS
Agreement").5 4 This agreement deals with measures adopted by
Member States in order to protect human, animal, plant life, and
health from risks of plant- or animal-borne pests or diseases and to
ensure food safety in general. Historically, the GATT had
recognized the right of contracting parties to take measures
necessary to protect human, animal, and plant life or health, even if
such measures impose trade restrictions. GATT Article XX(b)
provides a general exception for measures of this kind from the
obligations imposed by GATT-provided that such measures are
not applied in a manner that would constitute arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries or a disguised
restriction on international trade. Thus, the issue was seen as a
domestic policy matter, subject to the prohibition on discrimination
(both in relation to domestic products and suppliers, as well as to
53 The early coordination directives both refer to Article 100 of the EEC
Treaty, which is found in Chapter 3 of Title V of the Treaty, titled "Approximation
of Laws." EEC TREATY, supra note 12. It provides for the issuing of directives "for
the approximation of such provisions laid down by law, regulation or
administrative action in Member States as directly affect the establishment or
functioning of the common market." Id. at 54. The later public utilities directive,
Council Directive 90/531, refers to (the then existing) Article 100a, found in the
same chapter and with a wording similar to Article 100. See Council Directive
90/531, supra note 51. It also refers to Article 113, which deals with the common
commercial policy and talks about "uniform principles" and "the achievement of
uniformity in measures of liberalization." Id.
54 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
[hereinafter SPS Agreement], reprinted in RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, supra
note 13, at 69, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/15-
sps.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2004).
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those of other contracting parties), and there was no attempt to
harmonize national safety standards.
The SPS Agreement takes a different approach. It declares in its
preamble that the Members desire "to further the use of harmonized
sanitary and phytosanitary measures between Members."55 This
should be done on the basis of international standards, guidelines,
and recommendations developed by the relevant international
organizations, such as the Codex Alimentarius Commission,56 the
International Office of Epizootics, 57 and others. Article III of the
Agreement, under the heading "Harmonization," requires Member
States to base their SPS measures on international standards,
guidelines, or recommendations, where they exist, in order to
harmonize such measures "on as wide a basis as possible."58
National SPS measures that conform to such international standards
shall be deemed to be GATT consistent, while states that require
higher levels of protection must be able to justify them scientifically
in order to be GATT consistent. 59 Considering the heavy burden
often involved in such scientific justification, WTO Member States
have strong incentives to adopt existing international (uniform)
standards in order to stay clear of legal challenges. The rationale for
this approach stems probably from the realization that the diversity
in standards itself poses a trade barrier, in addition to its potential of
serving as a hard-to-detect disguise for national protectionist
55 Id. (emphasis added).
56 The Codex Alimentarius Commission was created in 1963 by the UN Food
and Agriculture Organization ("FAO") and the World Health Organization
("WHO") to develop food standards, guidelines, and related texts such as codes
of practice. See Codex Alimentarius Commission, FA/WHO Food Standards, at
http://www.codexalimentarius.net/indexen.stm (last visited Feb. 26,2004)
57 The International Office of Epizootics ("OlE") is an intergovernmental
organization devoted to animal health and created by the International
Agreement of Jan. 25, 1924. Today it has over 160 Member States. One of its tasks
is to develop standards and sanitary rules for animal health. The main normative
works produced by the OlE are the International Animal Health Code, the Manual of
Standards for Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines, the International Aquatic Animal Health
Code, and the Diagnostic Manual for Aquatic Animal Diseases, at http://
www.oie.int/eng/OIE/en-oie.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2004).
58 This obligation is subject to any exception expressly provided for in the
SPS Agreement, and in particular in paragraph 3 (the introduction of a higher
level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection-in which case such level must be
scientifically justified). See SP Agreement, supra note 54, at 71.
59 Id. As an alternative to scientific justification, Member States can base their
higher standards on risk assessment techniques "developed by the relevant
international organizations." See id. at 72.
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measures. 60 Again, starting from the premise of the need to
eliminate trade barriers, we can see how the GATT/WTO regime
has evolved from a non-interventionist approach, utilizing
traditional trade-law doctrines of MEN and National Treatment
(non-discrimination), to an approach clearly promoting harmon-
ization.
3.5. Intellectual Property Rights
To conclude our brief survey of GATT's gradual assumption of
the harmonization function, we now come to the instrument which
probably more than any other epitomizes this development - the
TRIPS Agreement. 61 This agreement, concluded as part of the
Uruguay Round, could not be considered as dealing with the
elimination of international trade barriers-at least not in the
traditional sense. Its subject matter is not international trade
measures, but rather domestic laws and policies, most of which
apply equally to both domestic and foreign players.62 Those policies
in the field of intellectual property must, under the TRIPS
Agreement, comply with certain minimum standards of legal
protection,63 which are prescribed by it, and all WTO members
whose domestic legal systems do not yet provide such protection are
required to amend their laws accordingly. 64 Those "minimum"
standards are in fact more than minimal, and tend to reflect the level
of intellectual property protection prevailing in the industrialized
countries (but in few developing countries) and mandated by
60 Governments have at times imposed trade restrictions, in the guise of
S&P measures, in order to protect a domestic industry. For example, a
country may prohibit imports of a particular agricultural product in
order to protect domestic producers of that product, citing an unfounded
risk of pest or disease .... Experience has shown that unjustified S&P
measures are frequently employed when other barriers to trade, such as
tariffs and non-tariff import restrictions are reduced or removed.
H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, at 742-63 (1994).
61 See TRIPS, supra note 7.
62 There are few exceptions to this characterization. For instance, Article 31 of
the TRIPS Agreement, which regulates Member States' use of compulsory
licensing, and the National Treatment and MFN Treatment required by Articles 3
and 4, respectively. See TRIPS, supra note 7, arts. 3, 4, 31. However, these are not
the most significant provisions of the TRIPS Agreement.
63 See TRIPS, supra note 7, arts. 2, 9, 10, 35 (discussing the various intellectual
property rights and protections that may be conferred by Member States).
64 See TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 1., para. 1 (requiring Members to implement
the provisions of TRIPS).
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leading international treaties. The standards relate both to the
availability, scope, and use of intellectual property rights, as well as
to the means of their enforcement. In fact, at least one of those
treaties -the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works-expressly states its objective to achieve as much
uniformity as possible among its signatories for the protection of
intellectual property. 65 Hence, the TRIPS Agreement is in effect
harmonizing previously divergent national laws in a central field of
commercial law - the law of intellectual property.
Nevertheless, the aim of "harmonization" cannot be found in
the official objectives of the TRIPS Agreement, as declared in its
preamble. Instead, it addresses the need to "reduce distortions and
impediments" to international trade, in a rather unconvincing
attempt to justify the connection between an intellectual property
treaty and a framework devoted to international trade
liberalization. The same applies to the insertion of the words
"Trade-Related Aspects" in the title of the agreement. It is not a
very convincing attempt to justify the connection, given that the
core of the TRIPS Agreement is the adoption of standards from
existing intellectual property treaties that until recently were not at
all considered to be "trade-related." It should be seen as part of the
traditional attempt of the GATT regime to distance itself from
intervention in the domestic policies of its signatories, and to deal
only with international trade measures.
This is not to say that the TRIPS Agreement has nothing to do
with international trade. No doubt, in a world of growing trade and
increasing interdependence, divergent levels of protection for
intellectual property may create uneven playing grounds and
distortions to international trade. Industries in a country with a low
level of protection can exploit inventions and creations originating
in countries with a high level of protection and thus deprive those
countries of export opportunities. However, that is not a direct
connection, but rather an indirect one, and in any case domestic
inventors and creators in the low-level country are also affected to
the same extent by the lack of protection. Furthermore, unlike plain
trade liberalization, which "the neo-classical theory of trade suggests
will, with certain defined exceptions, be always beneficial, both to the
domestic economic welfare of the liberalizing state, and to global
65 See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
July 24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 221, pmbl. (amended Sept. 28, 1979).
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economic welfare," 66 the TRIPS Agreement does not necessarily
benefit countries that are net importers of intellectual property, such
as the developing countries.67 For many of them it can therefore be
justified only as part of a broader bargain with some other trade-off
that is in their interest. What is more important: this is not a
phenomenon that is peculiar to intellectual property protection.
There are a myriad of areas of domestic policy where divergent
national policies and, in particular, divergent levels of legal
protection for different players, may distort the "level playing field"
and cause "impediments to international trade." Hence, once the
WTO has taken upon itself the task of "leveling playing fields" and
harmonizing conditions of competition, the potential agenda for
future initiatives is almost boundless.
In the Sections that follow, I will try to suggest some potential
initiatives that would seem most likely to be brought up within the
WTO, while discussing the pros and cons of such proposals and
their chances of being adopted. Having done so, one also must ask
oneself whether the WTO is the most suitable institution to deal
with the harmonization of law. What are the implications of the
WTO acting as a law-harmonizing institution in comparison to the
international bodies that hitherto have been involved in this task?
These are some of the questions that will be discussed in the last
Section of this paper.
4. POTENTIAL FUTURE HARMONIZATION INITIATIVES FOR THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
As has been shown above, harmonization has already become
part and parcel of the existing GATT/WTO regime. But even more
so, it seems to have become a central source of contention in the
public debate surrounding the WTO's future agenda. In the Section
that follows, I will discuss some of the areas where the WTO could
potentially contribute to the harmonization of certain domestic
policies in the future.
In the first part of the Section, I will discuss initiatives that
66 MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 253 (1995).
67 See A.V. Deardorff, Should Patent Protection Be Extended to All Developing
Countries?, 13 WORLD ECON. 497 (1990); Evelyn Su, The Winners and the Losers: The
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and Its Effects on
Developing Countries, 23 Hous. J. INT'L L. 169 (2000) (discussing the possible
detrimental and beneficial effects of the TRIPS Agreement).
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have already been included in the Doha Development Agenda- the
agreed mandate for a new round of multilateral trade negotiations
launched by the Ministerial Declaration adopted in Doha, Qatar, on
November 14, 2001.68 I will examine briefly the history of these
initiatives, the various alternatives open to the negotiators, their
harmonization aspects, and the likely outcome of the negotiations in
these fields. In the second part, I will discuss some other possible
initiatives that have not been included in the Doha mandate, but
which may very well be suggested for other future rounds.
4.1. Initiatives Already Proposed for the Doha Development Agenda
4.1.1. Harmonization of Government Procurement Law and
Procedures
The harmonization of government procurement procedures has
been discussed in Section 3 above in the context of projects that have
already been dealt with by the GATT/WTO regime in previous
rounds. It is, however, an important item also on the agenda for a
new round. The objective is to try to reach an agreement on
government procurement procedures that will be a part of the single
undertaking of the WTO, and hence bind all of the 148 current
members of the organization, not just some twenty or so countries
that currently are parties to the existing plurilateral AGP and most
of which are highly developed. The Singapore Ministerial
Conference convened in December 1996 set the path to such an
achievement. There, it was agreed to establish a working group "to
conduct a study on transparency in government procurement
practices, taking into account national policies, and, based on this
study, to develop elements for inclusion in an appropriate
agreement."69 In Doha, it was formally agreed that negotiations on
a multilateral agreement on transparency in government
procurement will take place after the Fifth Session of the
Ministerial Conference (that subsequently took place in Cancfin,
68 WTO Ministerial Conference, 4th Sess., Ministerial Declaration,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (Nov. 14, 2001) [hereinafter Doha Declaration], available at
http:/ /www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/minist-e/min0l-e/mindecl-e.htm.
69 WTO Ministerial Conference, Ministerial Declaration, para. 21 (Dec. 13,
1996) [hereinafter Singapore Declaration], quoted in WTO Working Group Report
on Transparency in Government Procurement to the General Council,
WT/WGTGP/1, para. 1 (Nov. 19, 1997), available at http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop-e/gproc-e/gptran-e.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2004).
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Mexico in September 2003) on the basis of a decision to be taken,
by explicit consensus, at that session on modalities of
negotiations. 70 These negotiations will build on the progress made
in the Working Group on Transparency in Government
Procurement by that time. 71 The idea behind the new initiative is to
tolerate, at least for now, existing price preferences and other explicit
discriminatory policies in favour of domestic suppliers, as long as
basic standards of transparency and competitive conditions are
met.
72
The harmonizing function of such an agreement would become
a much more central component than is the case with the AGP.
There are two reasons for this. Firstly, the fact that the new
agreement may become binding on a much larger group of states,
and, in particular, on developing countries that often lack any
regulation of government procurement, will significantly enhance
its harmonizing effect. Secondly, unlike the AGP, in which the
central objective was to get rid of trade barriers in the public sector
(in the form of protectionist procurement policies), the proposed
agreement does not prohibit such policies. Rather, it seeks to
achieve transparency in the procuring activities of all governments
by imposing on them certain basic standards of transparent
tendering procedures. A certain amount of harmonization is at the
core of this objective.
The emerging components of a possible agreement include
provisions on issues such as: (1) transparent information on
national procurement rules; (2) rules on where and how to publish
invitations to tender; (3) which information is to be included in such
70 There has been some disagreement among Member States on the precise
meaning of this formulation. Some Members see it as an outright agreement to
open negotiations on this issue, while others stress the need for another decision
taken by explicit consensus of all Members, for the negotiations to open.
According to the latter reading, the negotiations have not yet been launched, and
thus it is still not clear that government procurement will be included in the Doha
Round. The same applies to the other three Singapore issues -competition,
investment, and trade facilitation.
71 See Doha Declaration, supra note 68, para. 26 ("These negotiations will
build on the progress made in the Working Group on Transparency in
Government Procurement .... ).
72 See id. ("Negotiations shall be limited to the transparency aspects and
therefore will not restrict the scope for countries to give preferences to domestic
supplies and suppliers."). While the issue of "competitive conditions" is not
expressly mentioned in the Doha Declaration, it would seem to stem naturally
from the prescription of transparent tendering procedures.
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invitations; (4) rules on time tables for the procurement; (5) rules on
how to manage closed lists of qualified suppliers; (6) rules on
qualification procedures and bid documentation; (7) a requirement
for transparency of decisions on qualification; (8) rules on contract
award procedures and criteria and on post-award information; (9)
and a requirement to maintain fair and transparent judicial, arbitral,
or administrative review procedures. 73 As is usually the case with
GATT/WTO agreements in "new" areas, the initial agreement
would later be developed and expanded in subsequent negotiation
rounds.
4.1.2. Harmonization of Competition Law
The connection between competition law (or antitrust law, as it
is known in the United States) and international trade has always
been quite obvious. There are several ways in which anti-
competitive behavior by private firms can affect trade and even
prevent entrance by foreign firms. For instance, a firm can engage in
monopolization both inside and outside the national borders of its
domicile. A number of firms in one or more Member States may set
up a cartel in order to raise their export prices to other Member
States, thus exploiting the consumers in those states, or they can
agree to divide geographical markets in order to eliminate
competition between them. In some cases, such anticompetitive
behavior receives active support by host governments. In other
cases, they can exist due to a lack of regulation or enforcement.
Indeed, as traditional government barriers to trade have been
reduced, there have been increasing concerns that the gains from
such liberalization may be thwarted by private anticompetitive
practices. It is probably with this concern in mind that the Treaty of
Rome from the outset included rules on competition in order to
ensure that competition in the European Common Market is not
73 These components are taken from a proposed draft agreement submitted
by Singapore, Korea, Hungary, and the United States in preparation for the Seattle
Ministerial of December 1999. See WTO Working Group on Transparency in
Government Procurement, Preparations for the 1999 Ministerial Conference, The
WVTO's Contribution to Transparency in Government Procurement,
WT/WGTGP/W/27 (Nov. 9, 1999) (listing elements of a possible agreement).
They are also included as items on the agenda item of the Working Group on
Transparency in Government Procurement. See WTO Working Group Report on
Transparency in Government Procurement to the General Council,
WT/WGTGP/6 (Nov. 29, 2002) (listing items on the agenda of the working group
in its 2002 annual report).
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distorted.74 But not only the Treaty of Rome, which of course goes
far beyond what any conventional trade agreement would seek to
achieve, included such provisions. They have also been included in
all the free trade agreements concluded by the EC with its associated
trading partners, 75 as well as in other international trade
agreements. 76
GATT, in contrast, does not include any similar provisions and
does not yet deal systematically with the trade-competition
relationship. This deficiency was amply illustrated in the Kodak-Fuji
case, where a U.S. complaint against the alleged anticompetitive
nature of Japan's distribution channels for photographic film was
entirely rejected, largely because of lack of proper legal basis in the
provisions of GATT. 77 At the Singapore Ministerial Conference in
1996, it was decided to establish a Working Group on the Interaction
between Trade and Competition.78 The Doha Declaration talks
about a "multilateral framework to enhance the contribution of
competition policy to international trade," and here too it was
agreed that negotiations will start after the next Ministerial
Conference based on a consensus decision on the modalities. 79 The
Working Group has been directed to focus on the clarification of
core principles, including transparency, nondiscrimination and
procedural fairness, provisions on hardcore cartels, modalities for
voluntary cooperation, and support for progressive reinforcement of
competition institutions in developing countries through capacity
building.
The work in this area is only in its initial stages, and it is not yet
clear what type of agreement can and should be reached. What is
clear, however, is that out of the 148 current WTO members, only
74 ECC TREATY, supra note 12, arts. 85-86 (now arts. 81-82).
75 See, e.g., Agreement Between the State of Israel and the European Economic
Community, May 20, 1975, EC-Isr., art. 12, 1975 O.J. (L 136) 5 (including rules on
competition in the agreement between the EC and Israel); see also Euro-
Mediterranean Agreement Establishing an Association Between the European
Communities and Their Member States, of the One Part, and the State of Israel, of
the Other Part, Nov. 20, 1995, EC-Isr., art. 36, 2000 O.J. (L 147) 3, 10 (finding trade
agreements restricting trade as incompatible with the current agreement).
76 For an example of such agreements, see Article 4 of the 1988 Protocol
Between Australia and New Zealand, infra note 83.
77 See WTO Panel Report on Japan-Measures Affecting Consumer
Photographic Film and Paper, WT/DS44/R (Mar. 31, 1998) (rejecting the U.S.
complaint for lack of legal basis in its anti-competition claims against Japan).
78 See Singapore Declaration, supra note 69, at para. 21.
79 See Doha Declaration, supra note 68, para. 23; see also caveat supra note 70.
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about eighty have adopted some kind of competition laws.80 That
means that over sixty states have no competition laws at all, and
have therefore no legal means to prevent anticompetitive practices.
Among those who have them, there are certainly varying degrees of
enforcement. The Doha Declaration therefore puts much emphasis
on enhanced technical assistance and capacity building for the
developing and least developed countries.
81
One approach to combating anticompetitive practices that
impede trade - although admittedly a maximalist approach - would
be to adopt an agreement that sets comprehensive standards of
competition law, which would have to be adopted and enforced by
all parties. A more realistic approach would be to concentrate only
on some core principles, with standards that could be agreed on by
all. Such an agreement would probably, first and foremost, prohibit
the exemption of export cartels from national competition law.
These exemptions can be found in many WTO members, including
the United States and Japan, and they, in essence, permit firms to
exploit consumers as long as they are residents of other countries.
82
But in order to be effective and equally applicable, it would also
have to require states that lack any kind of competition law to adopt
a prohibition at least on such cartels (if not on all domestic cartels),
and then also require proper enforcement of such a prohibition.
Then, in order to deal with domestic practices that prevent entry of
foreign competitors - such as those alleged to have existed in the
80 See WTO Working Group Report on the Interaction Between Trade and
Competition Policy to the General Council, WT/WGTCP/2 (Dec. 8, 1998)
(discussing WTO members who have adopted competition laws).
81 See Doha Declaration, supra note 68, para. 24 (recognizing the need for
enhanced technical assistance and capacity building for the least developed
countries).
82 In the United States, such exemptions are granted under the Webb-
Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1997), as well as under the Export Trading
Company Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1233 (1982). See Foreign Trade
Antitrust Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1995). In Japan, exemptions are made
possible under the Transactions Law. In the EC, exemptions may fall outside the
scope of the ECC Treaty's competition rules, which apply only to practices "which
may affect trade between the Member States" and which may distort competition
"within the common market." See Brian Hindley, Competition Law and the WTO:
Alternative Structures for Agreement, in FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION, supra note
18, at 333-34 (discussing exemptions from national competition laws). In Israel, an
export cartel can also be granted an exemption under Article 10(7) of the
Restrictive Trade Practices Law, 1988, 42 L.S.I. 135, (1987-1988). Additional
support for this assessment can be found in the Doha Declaration, which talks
about "provisions on hardcore cartels." See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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Kodak-Fuji case -the agreement would have to go into more detailed
rules of competition, such as those adopted, for example, in the free
trade agreements of the EC. Theoretically, a state could implement
such obligations in relation to trade-related anti-competitive practices
without having to adopt or change any rules in relation to such
practices that only affect its domestic players. But once rules and
enforcement mechanisms are in place, it would seem quite senseless
to employ them only in defense of foreign firms or foreign
consumers, pursuant to an international agreement, and not in
defense of its own consumers and firms. It would seem more likely
that once the national regulator's attention has been drawn to the
problem of anticompetitive behavior and the need to draw up
regulation and set up enforcement agencies, a more comprehensive
approach would be taken towards the need to regulate competitive
behavior throughout the market. In doing so, the WTO again is
likely to have a significant harmonizing effect on the evolution of
national competition laws, even if it is only an indirect effect.
Finally, a future agreement on trade-related competition law
may attempt to regulate the phenomenon of transborder predatory
pricing. This refers to a situation where a firm from one state
attempts to get rid of a competing firm in another state by bringing
down its prices to below-cost of production, often cross-subsidizing
them through overpriced sales in a protected home market.
Presently, competition authorities in the country of the targeted firm
often find it hard to confront such behavior through the means of
their national competition laws, because of restrictions on its
territorial jurisdiction. Instead the country introduces antidumping
legislation, which-at least officially-is designed to combat such
predatory practices. In practice, such legislation is often used as a
pretext for sheer protectionist measures. If -as so many economists
have argued -an international agreement on competition law could
be adopted that would allow effective cooperation between the
competition authorities of its parties, it would make it possible to
deal with allegations of predatory practices within the confines of
competition law, instead of antidumping law. In such a setting one
could then get rid of antidumping procedures altogether. While this
is quite a utopian vision, given the strong political pressures that
have created and maintained antidumping proceedings for almost a
century now, it is still an idea to keep in mind, and one that has even
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been adopted at least in one regional trade agreement.83
4.1.3. Harmonization of Environmental Regulations
The issue of environmental standards is outside the scope of this
Article.84 Suffice it to say that the many problems that have surfaced
in the last two decades as a result of the differences in the prevailing
levels of environmental regulation in different countries could be
alleviated if an agreement could be reached on common minimum
standards. As in the case of SPS and TRIPS, the WTO would hardly
be in a position to set those standards by itself, but would have to
refer to existing multilateral env'xonmental agreements or
standards. A first step in that direction was taken already by the
first Tuna-Dolphin panel, which rejected the U.S. attempt to rely on
some of the Article XX environmental exceptions because, inter alia,
it had not demonstrated to the Panel "that it had exhausted all
83 In Article 4 of the 1988 Protocol between Australia and New Zealand,
pursuant to the Australian-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade
Agreement og 1998, Austl. T.S. No. 18, both countries agreed that as of 1990 all
antidumping actions between the two countries should cease and that any
antidumping duties then in place should be terminated. In place, harmonized
provisions of both countries' competition laws pertaining to abuse of dominant
position have been substituted. These provisions permit a complainant located in
one country to complain of abusive behavior by a firm or firms located in the
other country. The courts in the first country are then authorized to hold hearings
in the second country and to use the second country's courts to enforce subpoenas
and other orders. See TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 66, at 123. The fact is that
antidumping actions have been abolished as between the Member States of the
European Community ("EC"), at least partly based on the common competition
rules that now prevail and the fact that there is a supra-national enforcement
agency, namely the European Commission.
84 The last decade has seen an outburst of academic writing on this topic in
connection with the GATT and the World Trade Organization. See, e.g., THE
GREENING OF WORLD TRADE ISSUES (Kym Anderson et al. eds., 1992) (providing a
compilation of papers concerning trade and the environment); DANIEL C. EsTY,
GREENING THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT AND THE FUTURE (1994) (analyzing
policy failures that have contributed to the conflict created between freer trade
and environmental protection); Steve Charnovitz, Environmentalism Confronts
GATT Rules: Recent Developments and New Opportunities, 27 J. WORLD TRADE 37, 37
(1993) ("The purpose of this article is to discuss recent developments in the clash
between environmental policies and GATT rules."); Daniel A. Farber & Robert E.
Hudec, GATT Legal Restraints on Domestic Environmental Regulations, in FAIR TRADE
AND HARMONIZATION, supra note 18, at 59 (examining the conflict between trade
and the environment); OREN PEREZ, ECOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY AND GLOBAL LEGAL
PLURALISM: RETHINKING THE TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT CONFLICT (2003) (arguing
that the tension between trade liberalization and environmental protection, in its
focus on the WTO, fails take aspects of institutional and discursive complexity
into account).
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options reasonably available to it to pursue its dolphin protection
objectives through measures consistent with the GATT, in particular
through the negotiation of international cooperative
arrangements.... "85 This would seem to imply that if such an
agreement had been reached, or at least sought,86 the exception
could be invoked. Nevertheless, the legal status of multilateral
environmental agreements ("MEAs") within the WTO regime is still
unclear, and a new agreement clarifying this relationship and
granting recognition to standards set by such an agreement would
do much to solve the current tension.
In Doha, it was agreed to start negotiations on the relationship
between MEAs and existing WTO rules.87 These negotiations,
however, are to be limited in scope to the applicability of such
existing rules as among parties to the MEA in question, and may not
prejudice the WTO rights of any member that is not a party to the
MEA in question. Thus, once such an agreement is reached -and it
would appear to be a quite likely component of any new multilateral
trade deal-it could facilitate the harmonization of minimum
environmental standards around the world according to the
standards set by the relevant MEAs88- but only in relation to those
Member States that are parties to these MEAs. Those that are not
parties may not be forced to comply with such standards by trade
sanctions that are in conflict with their WTO rights. But for those
Member States that are parties to MEAs in question, the fact that
their standards will be sanctioned by the WTO multilateral trading
system will most likely strengthen them and contribute to their
observance.8 9
85 United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, supra note 4, para. 5.28.
86 From later jurisprudence of the WTO it is evident that an actual agreement
is not necessarily required, but rather, a sincere effort to negotiate one before
resorting to unilateral trade restrictions. See WTO Appellate Body Report on
United States- Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, paras.
166-72, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) (criticizing unilateral U.S. actions because
of the lack of efforts to negotiate first).
87 Doha Declaration, supra note 68, para. 31.
88 The extent of such harmonization would be similar to the extent agreed
upon by the signatories of such multilateral environmental agreements ("MEAs"),
which usually relate only to environmental problems with global or transnational
aspects. Problems with purely domestic dimensions, which usually are not
covered by MEAs, would be a matter for national regulation. This would also
allow national regulators to consider special domestic needs and circumstances.
89 For instance, one possible outcome of such an agreement is that trade
restrictions imposed pursuant to an MEA (for example, a ban on imports of
products the production of which may harm the ozone layer pursuant to the
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4.2. Examples of Other Potential Initiatives for the Future
Approximation of Labour Standards
The link between labour standards and international trade, and
the claim that divergent national labour standards would create
unfair competition, are as old as the GATT system itself.90 It was
expressed in the Havana Charter of the International Trade
Organization ("ITO") of 1948,91 which was intended to provide the
institutional framework for GATT, but which failed to gain the
required ratification of the U.S. Congress, and therefore never saw
the light of day.92 The Charter includes the declaration of its
members that "unfair labour conditions, particularly in production
for export, create difficulties in international trade, and accordingly,
each Member [sic] shall take whatever action may be appropriate
and feasible to eliminate such conditions within its territory." 93 In
the GATI itself, the link received a much more modest, but at least
operative, expression in Article XX(e), which provides an exception
for otherwise prohibited trade measures, if such measures relate to
the products of prison labour. Therefore, in view of the unfairness
inherent in a situation where such products compete against
domestic products produced by regularly paid free workers, WTO
members are allowed, under certain conditions, to adopt trade
restrictions against imports of such products.94 However, in relation
Montreal Protocol) will qualify for an exemption under Article XX of GATT. With
the worry of a GATT violation out of the way, it will become easier to achieve
more effective enforcement of MEAs. It is much less likely to expect an outcome
whereby a breach of an MEA will qualify as a breach of one of the WTO
agreements, which would enable the utilization of the strong enforcement
mechanism of the WTO.
90 For an account of the history and politics of this link, see generally Virginia
A. Leary, Workers' Rights and International Trade: The Social Clause (GATT, ILO,
NAFTA, U.S. Laws), in FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION, supra note 18, at 177-230.
91 Final Act and Related Documents of the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Employment, Havana, Cuba, Mar. 24, 1948, U.N. Doc. ICITO/1/4
(1948), reprinted in CLAIR WILcOx, A CHARTER FOR WORLD TRADE 227 (1949)
[hereinafter Havana Charter].
92 For an account of the reasons that lead to the death of the Havana Charter,
see for example WILLIAM DIEBOLD, THE END OF THE I.T.O. (1952); JOHN H. JACKSON,
WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE GENERAL
AGREEMENT OF TARIFFS AND TRADE 35-57 (1969);
93 Havana Charter, supra note 91, art. 7.
94 See GATT, supra note 13, art. XX (excluding measures relating to prison
labour from the scope of the agreement). The opening sentence ("chapeau") of
Article XX sets out the conditions for invoking the exceptions listed in the article,
which are that the otherwise prohibited measures are not applied "in a manner
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to any other circumstances of unequal labour conditions, there is no
permission under the GATT, as it stands today, to take any
protective measures against products from another Member State.
Demands to broaden the existing exception to include
"internationally recognized worker rights" have been raised by the
United States (occasionally with the support of several European
countries) ever since 1953, including at the end of the Uruguay
Round. It also featured, as a central U.S. demand, in the discussions
leading up to the Seattle Ministerial.95 The demand has, however,
been met with staunch opposition from the developing countries,
who see it as an attempt to restrict their exports to the developed
world.
Following the precedent set by the TRIPS Agreement, this issue
has now gained further steam. There can hardly be any doubt that
the conditions under which workers are employed in the
manufacture of goods (which then are exported or sold as import
substitutes in the domestic market) are just as "trade-related" as the
standards of protection of intellectual property rights, if not more so.
Countries that do not guarantee and enforce basic labour standards
have an undue cost advantage over those countries that do. Import-
competing and exporting firms in the latter countries may respond
to this disadvantage by depressing wages or pressing their
governments to lower the prevailing standards in order to enable
them to compete, or, at a minimum, demands from labour unions to
further raise the standards may be rejected based on the concern that
this will further deteriorate the local industry's competitive position.
The proponents of linking labour standards to trade within the
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on
international trade." Id.
95 See, e.g., Attempt to get Labour on WTO Agenda Rejected, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 9,
1999. As part of the Seattle Ministerial preparations, the United States put forward
a proposal to establish a WTO Working Group on labour issues. The proposal
calls for a group to examine trade issues related to labour, specifically trade and
employment, trade and social protections, trade and core labour standards,
positive trade policies incentives and core labour standards, trade and forced or
exploitative child labour, and trade and derogation from national labour
standards. See Implementation Issues: The Rocky Road to Seattle, 3 BRIDGES: BETWEEN
TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, No. 46, Nov. 24, 1999 (discussing Seattle
Ministerial positions), available at http://www.ictsd.org/English/Bridges3-8.pdf.
The U.S. position was a result of a Congressional mandate that the United States
should seek such a working group. The request was also politically expedient to
assuage a very vocal labour movement in the United States whose support is
necessary to maintain U.S. momentum toward further trade liberalization. Id.
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WTO, therefore, argue that such linkage is necessary in order to
prevent a "race to the bottom" in prevailing labour standards
prompted by the globalization of the economy. In addition, there
are, of course, the human rights aspects of such a linkage,
particularly when we speak of basic core standards, the universal
respect of which go far beyond economic considerations of fair
competition. Indeed, many human rights activists are calling upon
the WTO to use its effective enforcement mechanism, as well as the
power of the entire international trading system in order to facilitate
the enforcement of basic human rights, including workers' rights.96
It is extremely unlikely that some open-ended exception clause,
under which any differences in labour standards can serve as a
justification for import restrictions or for import duties to
"countervail the inequality," will ever be adopted in the WTO. The
developing countries would never agree to that, and it is even
doubtful whether some of the developed countries would. Even
U.S. products could be countervailed under such a clause when
imported into the EU considering that European workers generally
enjoy a higher level of labour rights protection than in the United
States. What could, however, be acceptable is some sort of an
agreement on a linkage with "core labour standards" or minimum
"internationally recognized worker's rights." This could be done in
many different ways. For instance, WTO members could agree on
some very fundamental standards, such as a prohibition against
forced labour and child labour and the right to organize and bargain
collectively. Such an agreement (which could be named Trade
Related International Labour Rights, or "TRILs") would be made an
integral part of the WTO's single undertaking, just like TRIPS is
today. An existing precedent to such an approach in the field of
labour standards is the North American Agreement on Labour
Cooperation 97 that was signed in 1993 as a supplementary
agreement to the NAFTA9S to alleviate concerns about lax
96 See, e.g., Werner Meng, International Labour Standards and International Trade
Law, in THE WELFARE STATE, GLOBALIZATION, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 371 (Eyal
Benvenisti & Georg Nolte eds., 2004) (advocating cooperation between the WTO
and the ILO to address the issue of labour standards affecting international trade).
For a discussion of this argument, see Arie Reich, Core Labour Standards and the
WVTO: Beware of Unilateralism! - A Response to Werner Meng, in THE WELFARE STATE,
GLOBALIZATION, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 395; TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 66,
188-89.
97 North American Agreement on Labour Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, 32
I.L.M. 1499.
98 See supra note 5.
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enforcement of labour standards in Mexico. Alternatively, instead
of prescribing positive obligations in this field, the members could
agree to extend the exception already existing in Article XX(e) of the
GATT to cases where these specifically defined core labour
standards have not been met, causing unfair competitive conditions
for domestic producers. This would allow Member States to restrict
or countervail imports originating from such conditions of
manufacturing, but it would probably not help very much when
competing against them in third countries.99 The main problem
with the second alternative is that it would allow Member States to
take unilateral action, forcing affected Member States to challenge
this trade impeding action through the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism. Meanwhile, the trade-impeding measure would be in
force, awaiting the conclusion of the dispute settlement proceedings
and implementation procedures.100 The first alternative, in contrast,
would only permit sanctions after multilateral authorization
following an impartial examination of the claim that fundamental
standards are not being respected in another Member State.
In any case, what we would have is an instrument within the
WTO regime that facilitates harmonization- or at least
approximation -of basic labour law standards in all Member States.
These basic standards could be set by the WTO itself or more likely,
by reference to existing international conventions as was done in
TRIPS. In this way, the WTO would preclude the criticism that it
meddles in affairs in which it has no expertise or in which it has not
the appropriate institutional structure to regulate.101 The ILO, in
contrast, has been initiating and promoting international labour
conventions defining workers rights ever since its inception in 1919.
99 Here the high-standard country has no way to restrict the imports from the
low-standard country into a third country, and that country may have no interest
at all in restricting the importation of cheap goods into its market for the benefit of
its consumers. What the high-standard country could perhaps do is to confer
export-subsidies to its affected industries, helping them compete against the
products from the low-standard country. While such subsidies are generally
prohibited under the 1994 Subsidies Agreement, a general exception under Article
XX of the GATF would permit them in these specific circumstances. See 1994
Subsidies Agreement, supra note 33, art. 20, para. 20.6.
100 For a discussion of the dangers to the multilateral trade system from such
unilateral measures, see Reich, supra note 96, at 401-06.
101 The WTO is an organization in which only governments are members.
Negotiations toward international agreements in the field of labour standards
usually allow the participation of labour unions and employers, and permit ample
representation of their interests in the process.
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It has a tripartite structure that allows not only the active
participation of governments in the decision process, but of
employers and workers as well. Therefore, some sort of
collaboration between the two organizations in this respect would
only seem natural. What would have to be negotiated is which of
the ILO's many conventions relating to fundamental rights and
principles ought to be included-and therefore enforceable -within
the WTO regime. Labour unions, especially in developed countries,
would prefer an extensive list of rights - including rights to just and
favourable conditions of work, fair wages, safe and healthy working
conditions and protection against unemployment. This is very
unlikely to ever get the approval of developing countries. More
realistic proposals speak of a more limited gamut, namely freedom
of association, right to collective bargaining, prohibition on forced
labour and severe forms of child labour, and discrimination in
employment. To reach an agreement on this, no doubt some sort of
bargain will have to be struck with the developing countries,
granting them concessions in the fields of their interest, such as
textiles and agriculture. What is very feasible, judging from
experience in other GATT contexts, is that initially a very limited list
of rights will be agreed on-for instance, forced labour and a
relatively low minimum age for the employment of children-just in
order to "get a foot in the door," while further extension of the list
would await future negotiations.102
4.2.1. Harmonization of Product Liability Law
Products moving across borders have been the business of
GATT ever since its inception in 1947. One of the factors that may
influence the marketing of products is the problem of product
liability, i.e., the extent to which the manufacturer, importers, or
distributors can be held liable for any damage caused by a defective
product. The laws and legal environment governing product
liability differ considerably from state to state, and these differences
may cause barriers to the free flow of trade and distort international
competition. For instance, a jurisdiction with strict tort liability for
defective products, and where punitive damages are often imposed
on manufacturers of such products in serious bodily injury cases,
102 For alternative solutions to this problem, see Reich, supra note 96, at 406-09
(suggesting possible approaches such as establishing a non-political international
mechanism to promote core labour standards and creating a system of positive
incentives).
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places a heavy cost on manufacturers operating within it. This cost
may be manifested in actual payments of damages, in litigation
costs, or in high liability insurance premiums, coupled with indirect
costs in connection with damaged reputation. 03  In contrast,
manufacturers operating in jurisdictions with a low standard of
liability, such as a regular negligence standard with no
compensation for pain and suffering, no punitive damages, and
where caps are placed on other compensatory damages, save
themselves these costs and may consequently be able to sell their
products at lower prices. They may also enjoy another advantage
over their competitors in other jurisdictions because they can test
their new products in their home markets for potential liability
without encountering crippling litigation and liability costs before
moving on to foreign markets with higher liability standards. 104
Thus, harmonization of product liability standards in WTO member
countries could be another possible project for the WTO in line with
its new mandate of "leveling playing fields" and harmonizing
conditions of competition.
Indeed, the EC, in the early 1980s, recognized the trade impact of
diverging liability standards and initiated a harmonization directive.
The Directive,105 adopted in 1985, purports to harmonize the laws on
103 See Katherine A. Davies, An International Drug Administration: Curing
Uncertainty in International Pharmaceutical Product Liability, 18 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
685, 710-11 (1998) (noting the increase in costs pharmaceutical companies are.
experiencing due to product liability, including litigation costs, excessive jury
awards, high insurance premiums, and heightened marketing costs of
counteracting negative publicity). Insurance premiums have skyrocketed in
recent years due to the difficulty to calculate the risks associated with
pharmaceutical production in today's U.S. litigation and liability climate); see also
Christoph Ann, Innovators in the Crossfire: A Policy Sketch for Unknowable Risks in
European and United States Product Liability Law, 10 TUL. EUR. & Civ. L.F. 173, 183
(1995) (giving reasons for not including innovation risks in product liability and
suggesting the externalization of damages be put on non-innovative producers).
104 See Alfred E. Mottur, The European Product Liability Directive: A Comparison
with U.S. Law, an Analysis of its Impact on Trade, and a Recommendation for Reform so
as to Accomplish Harmonization and Consumer Protection, 25 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS.
983, 1008 (1994) (arguing that European companies will not shy away from the
innovation and risk-taking that is discouraged in the U.S. market by the fear of
liability and its concurrent high costs. "If a company's product can hold up under
the [EC legal regime], then it can export them to the United States, more confident
that they will not be the subject of suit there.").
105 Council Directive 85/374, 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29, reprinted in EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY LAW SELECTED DOCUMENTS 642-48 (George A. Bermann et al. eds.,
1993) (adopting a directive on the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations, and
Administrative provisions of the Member States Concerning Liability for
Defective Productions).
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product liability within the EC Member States to create a level
competitive playing field, promote the free movement of goods and
raise the standard of consumer protection within the Community.
The preamble states:
Whereas approximation of the laws of the Member States
concerning the liability of the producer for damage caused
by the defectiveness of his products is necessary because
the existing divergences may distort competition and affect
the movement of goods within the common market and
entail a differing degree of protection of the consumer
against damage caused by a defective product to his health
or property .... 106
The Directive establishes a strict liability standard, i.e., liability
without fault, subject to only a few defenses and requires EC
Member States to implement this standard in their respective legal
systems. Considering the inherent difficulty in proving negligence
of manufacturers, given the inability of plaintiffs to access technical
information and expertise, such legal change is very helpful to
potential victims of defective products. In order to succeed in a
lawsuit, all they have to prove is the defect in the product, the
damage suffered, and the causal link between the two.10 7 Besides
ensuring compensation to victims, strict liability also increases
manufacturers' incentive to provide satisfactory product safety.
Thus, in addition to the "leveling of playing fields" rationale, a
WTO harmonization initiative in the field of product liability would
also fit in with the declared objective of the WTO and the GATT of
"raising standards of living."l08 By increasing liability and raising
safety standards of traded products in all its Member States, the
WTO would make an important contribution to the welfare of
consumers all over the world in a field that is still connected to its
traditional main area of competence- trade in goods. By doing so, it
would also respond to the common criticism that it only caters to the
106 Id. pmbl., at 642.
107 Id. art. 4 ("The injured person shall be required to prove the damage, the
defect and the causal relationship between defect and damage.").
108 See the First Preamble of the WTO agreement, supra note 13, at 6; GATT,
supra note 13, at 486.
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interests of business and multinationals and not to "plain people," 109
and perhaps improve its rather battered public image.
4.2.2. Other Potential Areas: Tax Policies, Company Law,
Consumer Protection.
In line with the types of rationales raised in the discussion
above, several other areas could, in the future, become potential
targets for harmonization within the WTO. One such area is tax
policy. Here too, the rationale for harmonization would be to
equalize conditions of competition and to prevent harmful tax
competition between states struggling to attract capital investments
to their respective jurisdictions. Because in our era of globalization,
capital is more mobile than labour, both developed and developing
countries are forced to lower their capital tax rates, depriving them
of revenue and forcing them to rely on labour tax and other forms of
taxation less progressive than the income tax.110 The only way to
stop the "race to the bottom," which has created a serious threat to
the welfare state, is by international cooperation aimed at
harmonization."' One likely forum for such harmonization is the
WTO. While tax policy hitherto has not been within the express
mandate of the WTO, some national tax measures may come into
conflict with the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
109 The criticism is even quoted on the WTO website as a "common
misunderstanding" about the WTO. The World Trade Organization, 10 Common
Misunderstandings About the WTO [hereinafter Common Misunderstandings],
available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatise/lOmis-e/lOmOO-e.
htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2004).
110 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal
Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARv. L. REV. 1573 (2000) ("Tax competition has
resulted in a significant potential for evasion and avoidance of taxation on the
income from cross-border portfolio and direct investments, which may lead to
significant tax base erosion and revenue losses."); Mathew Bishop, Special Survey:
Globalization and Tax, 354 ECONOMIST, Jan. 29, 2000, iss. 8155 (discussing costs and
benefits of internal tax competition).
1 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 110. However, Avi-Yonah proposes that such
harmonization is done through the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and
Development ("OECD"). Id. at 1662. Since this organization includes only
developed countries, it would mean that developing countries would not be
bound by the agreements. It is questionable whether this would be enough to
prevent harmful tax competition. Avi-Yonah argues that the OECD members are
currently both the destination of most portfolio investments and the largest
markets, and they are therefore best positioned to implement changes. However,
if the ability to use these countries as tax havens is eliminated, new markets may
evolve outside the OECD. Id. at 1665-66.
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Measures, 112 and this in turn has led to some much debated dispute
settlement procedures between the European Union ("EU") and the
United States." 3 A new harmonization measure within the WTO,
however, would probably not deal with fiscal export subsidies, but
rather strive to set minimum standards or levels of capital taxation.
Here too, harmonization within the WTO would follow the
precedent of the EU, which has adopted-albeit with much
difficulty - several measures designed to tackle harmful tax
competition.1
4
Other potential areas for multilateral harmonization within the
WTO could be company law,115 consumer-protection law,116 and
112 See 1994 Subsidies Agreement, supra note 33, art. 1.1(a)(1)(ii) (providing
that a subsidy shall be deemed to exist if "government revenue that is otherwise
due is foregone or not collected" and indicating expressly that "fiscal incentives
such as tax credits" fall within this category).
113 The most recent one is WTO Panel Report on United States-Tax
Treatment of "Foreign Sales Corporations", WT/DS108/R (Oct. 8, 1999). This was
appealed in WTO Appellate Body Report on United States-Tax Treatment for
"Foreign Sales Corporations", WT/DS108/AB/R (Feb. 24, 2000).
114 See Conclusions of the ECOFIN Council Meeting Concerning Taxation
Policy, 1998 O.J. (C 2) 1; Commission Proposal for a Council Directive to Ensure
Effective Taxation of Savings Income in the Form of Interest Payments within the
Community, 2001 O.J. (C 270E) 259. The European Union ("EU") package
included three measures: a nonbinding "code of conduct" for business taxation, a
draft directive on taxation of savings, and a draft directive on taxation of cross-
border interest and royalty payments.
115 The rationale for harmonization of company law would also be to prevent
a "race to the bottom" in regulation of company law in order to attract foreign
investors and prevent local investors from registering their companies in foreign,
more "founder-friendly" jurisdictions. Such jurisdictions also create advantages
for its corporations in relation to other jurisdictions. For instance, a corporation
established in a jurisdiction with high standards of directors' liability has to pay
significant sums for directors' liability insurance premiums, while a company
established in a jurisdiction with no such liability saves itself such costs. A race to
the bottom in this connection has been claimed to exist between the state
jurisdictions of the United States and has therefore produced calls for federal
regulation. See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 666 (1974) ("It is clear that the major protections to
investors, creditors, employees, customers, and the general public ... must
continue to come, from Federal legislation...."); Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to the
Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law,
76 Nw. U. L. REV. 913 (1982) (stating Delaware's enabling corporation statute does
not fail to provide adequate protection to shareholders); Stanley A. Kaplan,
Fiduciary Responsibility in the Management of the Corporation, 31 Bus. LAW. 883 (1976)
(discussing whether state or federal regulation is more appropriate).
116 The rationales for harmonization in the field of consumer law are similar
to those described above in relation to product liability law. Firms operating in
jurisdictions with strict consumer protection laws incur higher costs than those
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other fields of intellectual property law.117
5. IMPLICATIONS OF THE INSTITUTIONAL SETTING: THE PROS AND
CONS OF HARMONIZATION THROUGH THE WTO
As shown in the previous Section, the potential for
harmonization of law and economic policies through the WTO is
almost boundless. Of course, that is not to say that all of the
potential will materialize or that it is going to be easy to reach
consensus even on those initiatives that have already been raised
within the organization. In fact, the political obstacles are huge and
it is still unclear whether the WTO will be able to even launch
negotiations on some of the "new" Doha issues given that "explicit
consensus" is required." 8 The recent collapse of the Canctdn
Ministerial, without consensus on any of the items on its agenda
and, in particular, amidst bitter divisions over these very issues,
raises the serious question of whether the WTO has not
overextended its mandate. Indeed, the larger the membership of
the organization gets, the harder it is going to be to reach an
agreement on a deal, and the recent accession of the People's
Republic of China may make things even more complicated.
Nevertheless, at least some of the initiatives have a good chance to
materialize in some form or another in the not too distant future, just
like some of the initiatives which looked very unlikely only a decade
ago have already materialized following the Uruguay Round-to
the surprise of many observers. It, therefore, is important to be
aware of this unofficial role that the WTO is playing as a
operating in jurisdictions with lax consumer protection laws. In addition, the
mere divergence in these laws create barriers to the free flow of goods and impose
costs on producers who must try to conform with the many different standards
and requirements of the various jurisdictions to which their products are
exported. Some of these problems, as far as they relate to technical standards, are
already part of the WTO mandate and are regulated (albeit not very successfully)
by the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, but most other issues usually
regulated by national consumer protection laws are still outside the scope of any
WTO agreement.
117 Several contentious issues in intellectual property law were not resolved
by the TRIPS Agreement and may be dealt with in future agreements. For
instance, the agreement did not address the issue of parallel imports (importation
of genuine products by an importer unauthorized by the manufacturer and owner
of the trademark or patent of the products) and several issues in connection with
geographical indications.
118 See Doha Declaration, supra note 68, paras. 23, 26 (relating to competition
policy and government procurement respectively). The same applies to
investment. Id. para. 20.
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harmonizing institution and to evaluate its advantages and
disadvantages when compared to the work of traditional
institutions of harmonization. In light of the problems that will be
identified, we will then try to suggest improvements to the
"legislative" process of the WTO so as to make it more fit for the
new role that it has assumed.
It should be stressed that we do not attempt to evaluate the
normative case for or against harmonization of law per se. This is a
contentious issue that has been discussed in the literature." 9 Rather,
we start from the conclusion reached above that harmonization has
taken place within the WTO, and that there is a good chance that the
organization will continue to play an important role in this field.
That being the case, one should consider its institutional aptness to
such a task.
5.1. The WVTO vs. Traditional Harmonizing Institutions: Equalizing
Terms of Competition vs. Reducing Differences in National
Laws - Different Obstacles, Different Solutions
Harmonization of commercial and trade law is motivated by
three major factors, all of which are strongly connected and fueled
by globalization:
* the wish to eliminate those obstacles to international
commercial activities that are caused by differences in
national laws and regulations;
* the desire to equalize terms of competition and "level the
playing field" in order to promote global efficiency or to
prevent what are perceived as unfair trading conditions;
and
* mutual cultural and ideological influences.
The last factor, which is outside the scope of the present Article,
119 See generally Rene David, The International Unification of Private Law, in 11-5
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW; KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN
KOTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW (2d revised ed. 1987); Martin
Boodman, The Myth of Harmonization of Laws, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 699 (1991)
(analyzing harmonization as a vehicle for legal reform); David W. Leebron, Claims
for Harmonization: A Theoretical Framework, 27 CAN. Bus. L.J. 63 (1996) (proposing
an analytical framework for assessing the potential worth of harmonization); Paul
B. Stephan, The Futility of Unification and Harmonization in International Commercial
Law, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 743 (1999) (criticizing harmonization and questioning its
benefits to facilitate international commercial transactions).
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does not need any international organization to materialize. It is
largely a spontaneous reaction to global changes, where ideological
and technological developments create greater openness and
awareness to what is happening in other jurisdictions, and this in
turn has its impact on both the legislative and judicial process in
many countries. In today's global society, legislators and judges
have greater access to information about the legal systems of other
countries and their relative success or failure. They are, therefore,
more able to base the design of their legislative or judicial initiatives
on foreign models and, in particular, on successful ones. As a result,
these will tend to spread internationally, more so than the less
successful ones.
But coming back to the first two factors -it is here that the WTO
differs from most other law-harmonizing institutions. For the WTO,
the most prominent rationale for harmonization is the first one -the
wish to eliminate differences in order to make it easier to trade
across borders and to make the legal environment of international
business more stable and predictable. In this category we have
important harmonization instruments such as the UNCITRAL
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,120 the
Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary Credits issued by
the International Chamber of Commerce ("ICC"),121 the
UNIDROIT's Convention on International Interests in Mobile
Equipment, 122 and the various international conventions on
transportation law, such as the Warsaw Convention 123 and the
120 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 58 (adopting uniform rules governing the
international sale of goods), available at http://www.uncitral.org/english/texts/
sales/CISG.htm.
121 INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, PUB. No. 500, ICC UNIFORM CuSTOMS AND
PRACTICE FOR DOCUMENTARY CREDITS (1993) (promulgating international rules on
the role of banks in international transactions).
122 The convention was adopted at a diplomatic conference held in Cape
Town, South Africa under the auspices of UNIDROIT and the International Civil
Aviation Organization in 2001, and has been signed so far by 26 states, including
the United States. Its objective is to facilitate the financing of the acquisition and
use of mobile equipment of high value (such as aircraft, trains, containers, oilrigs,
etc.). See Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, Nov. 16,
2001 (citing information about its working procedures), available at
http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions /mobile-equipment/mobile-
equipment.pdf.
123 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Carriage by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 261 U.N.T.S. 423, (adopting harmonized rules
regulating air transport), available at http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/air.carriage.war
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Hague-Visby Rules 124 to name just a few. When faced with such
harmonization initiatives, few countries have an inherent interest in
maintaining the existing situation of divergence. Its exporters and
importers of goods, services, or capital are likely to suffer from the
disharmony just as much as those of other countries. The main
difficulty facing the harmonizing institution, therefore, is to
convince the country that the proposed international instrument is a
better legislative measure than the one existing in the national
system, or at least not inferior to it, and that the gains of uniformity
outweigh the benefit of sticking to the existing and well-known
system. In the WTO, however, the main impetus for law-
harmonizing initiatives, in particular in the "new" and future fields,
is the desire to level the playing field.
125
Here we often encounter an almost inherent difficulty: there is
at least one country - and often more than one - that benefits from
the existing situation, and whose producers hence enjoy an
advantage over those in other countries. It has therefore no interest
in harmonization. On the contrary, harmonization is against its
national interest. In this simple fact lie both the advantage and
disadvantage of the WTO as a law-harmonizing institution. The
disadvantage is in the inherent difficulty that this situation poses for
the harmonization initiative. So long as full consent to the initiative
is required from all related parties, the only way to obtain the
consent of the disinterested party is to offer it some other type of
benefit in exchange for its agreement to bind itself to the
harmonizing measure and to give up its current advantage. But
herein also lies the advantage of the WTO over other institutions. It
has the ability that other institutions lack to offer that other benefit
to uninterested parties in order to make it worth their while.
Alternatively, it can threaten to withdraw benefits that such
saw.convention.1929/ doc.html.
124 International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law
Relating to Bills of Lading, Aug. 25, 1924, 120 L.N.T.S. 155 [hereinafter Hague
Rules], as amended by the Protocol to Amend the International Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading, Feb. 23, 1968, 1412
U.N.T.S. 127 ("Visby Amendments"), available at http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/sea
.carriage.hague.visby.rules.1968/ doc.html.
125 For instance, the TRIPS Agreement, the new initiatives in the field of
government procurement and competition policy, and possible future initiatives
in labour standards, product liability, consumer protection, company law, and tax
law. Some of these initiatives have other rationales as well, but this does not
affect the soundness of the arguments that follow.
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uninterested parties have been enjoying within the organization if
they refuse to join a new "package deal" negotiated within its
auspices. Due to the wide range of issues that are subject to the
WTO regime, the framework can offer a wide array of bargaining
opportunities - including "cross-section" bargains - that may allow
consensus building between very different economies.
This advantage is what has enabled the WTO to succeed where
other institutions have failed. Take the World Intellectual Property
Organization ("WIPO"), for instance, which for many years was
unable to obtain the accession of several developing countries to its
conventions on intellectual property. The organization also suffered
severely from a weak dispute settlement mechanism and a weak
enforcement mechanism. 26 It was the WTO that managed to obtain
the commitments from those countries to abide by the WIPO
conventions, and it succeeded in this task by making those
commitments a part of the package deal ("the single undertaking")
of the newly established organization. 27 Countries could not
become members of the WTO unless they agreed to commit
themselves to the entire package, including the new TRIPS
Agreement. 128 No country could afford to remain outside the WTO
lest it was willing to cut itself out of the global economy.
The United States and some other WTO members are now trying
to duplicate that success in the field of government procurement.
Here, too, we have a previous attempt by a traditional (and less
powerful) harmonizing institution, namely the UNCITRAL, to
convince countries (in particular developing countries) to pass
126 See Robert J. Pechman, Seeking Multilateral Protection for Intellectual
Property: The United States "TRIPS" Over Special 301, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 179,
182-83 (1998) (discussing the weakness of the Paris Convention and the
International Court of Justice as enforcement mechanisms).
127 Since the enactment of the WTO Agreement in 1995, the World Intellectual
Property Organization has experienced a major increase in its membership, which
stands today at 179, and the membership to those of its conventions that are
supported by the TRIPS Agreement. Almost all of the new signatories are
developing countries, many of which have signed the conventions following their
accession to the WTO. See, e.g., WIPO, Notifications: Berne Convention (listing
nations acceding to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works since 1995), at http://www.wipo.org/treaties/en/ShowResults
.jsp?search_what=N&treatyid=15 (last visited Feb. 26, 2004); WIPO, Notifications:
Paris Convention (listing nations acceding to the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property since 1995), at http://www.wipo.org/treaties/
en/ShowResults.jsp?search what=N&treaty-id=2 (last visited Feb. 26, 2004).
128 For a more detailed discussion of the TRIPS Agreement, see the discussion
supra Section 3.5.
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legislation regulating their procurement activities. The UNCITRAL
already recognized in the mid 1980s 129 that many developing
countries suffered from a lack of legislation in this important field of
government activity and spending, and that this impeded their
economic development. After extensive work, in 1993 it adopted a
Model Law on Procurement of Goods and Construction ("Model
Law") and in 1994 a broader version also covering procurement of
services. 30 Had the Model Law been adopted by a large number of
countries, it would have contributed significantly not only to greater
transparency, fairness, and objectivity in the procurement process,
but also to greater uniformity in the procurement laws around the
world. The Model Law, however, has failed to gain wide
acceptance, and to date only eighteen developing countries have
enacted legislation based on or largely inspired by it.131 The World
Bank has also worked on promoting regulation of government
procurement for some time now and, on occasion, made it a
condition for granting loans, but only with modest success.132
In the field of procurement, it is not necessarily a genuine
interest of the disinterested country that serves as the obstacle, but
rather a genuine interest of the ruling class, politicians, and civil
servants who sometimes take advantage of the existing unregulated
situation by extracting bribes and other benefits from firms wishing
to contract with their government. It is with this situation in mind
that the United States, the EU, and others are pressing for the
inclusion of an Agreement on Transparency in Government
129 At its nineteenth session in 1986, the UNCITRAL decided to undertake
work in the area of procurement as a matter of priority and entrusted that work to
the Working Group on the New International Economic Order. See Report of the
U.N. Commission on International Trade Law, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 17,
para. 243, U.N. Doc. A/41/17 (1986) (prioritizing procurement in the
Commission's agenda).
130 UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of Goods, Construction and Services,
U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 17, Annex 1, U.N. Doc. A/49/17 (1994), revised
by U.N. Doc. A/49/17/Corr.1 (1994) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law on
Procurement of Goods].
131 See UNCITRAL, Status of Conventions and Model Laws, sec. 12 (detailing
which nations used the Model law, at http://www.uncitral.org/english/status/
index.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2004)).
132 See THE WORLD BANK, GUIDELINES: PROCUREMENT UNDER IBRD LOANS AND
IDA CREDITS, sec. 2 (Jan. 21, 1995) (regulating procurement for projects founded
by the World Bank), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRO
PROCUREMENT/RESOURCES/PROCUREMENT-Guidelines-November-
2003.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2004).
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Procurement within the single undertaking of the WTO. 133 They are
hoping that the WTO will succeed where other organizations have
hitherto failed. Of course for that to happen, the rich countries will
have to offer reciprocal benefits of some type or another within the
WTO system to the developing countries, which otherwise will be
reluctant to change the situation. Harnessing the WTO to the task of
regulating the procurement sector will not only improve the chances
of having a large number of countries submit to a harmonized
procurement regime, but will also significantly improve the chances
that it will be enforced given the WTO's relatively effective dispute
settlement and enforcement mechanism.
5.2. Problems with Harmonization through the ITO
In view of the special appeal of using the WTO for such and
other harmonization initiatives, it becomes increasingly important to
examine and evaluate the potential problems in connection with
harmonization of law through the WTO, as compared to the bodies
that hitherto have been performing this role. On the one hand, we
enjoy the advantages of a highly developed institutional framework
offering both a strong enforcement mechanism almost
unprecedented in the sphere of international law, as well as a wide
range of topics and interests that can be interconnected in a
mutually advantageous bargain. On the other hand, a priori, there
are bound to be problems when an institution that was established
and designed in order to liberalize international trade, and not to
deal with harmonization of law or of socioeconomic policies, is
drawn into the latter task. These problems may emanate both from
the structural characteristics of the institution, as well as from its
political and ideological orientation. In the following Section, we
will try to outline some of these potential problems. The question
that emerges in view of them is how well founded and serious are
the various concerns that we raise, whether the advantages
outweigh the disadvantages, and what could be done to alleviate
some of the problems.
5.2.1. The Trade Bias
By virtue of its mandate and orientation, the World Trade
Organization is likely to be committed first and foremost to the
promotion of international trade. Member States usually send their
133 See supra Section 3.3 (discussing government procurement).
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trade attaches to represent them in the organization, and the
ministries in charge are usually trade or finance ministries. The
WTO's major harmonization initiatives, as we have seen, have until
now always been somewhat "trade related," even where they have
significant impact on many non-trade aspects of regulation. It
follows that in the design of harmonization initiatives within the
WTO, there is bound to be a certain trade bias, i.e., a natural
preference for objectives connected to trade promotion. This may
come at the expense of other legitimate objectives and values. As
long as the organization deals with "pure" trade issues, or issues
whose trade component is dominant, this trade bias may be less of a
problem. But as its mandate broadens, and it enters new areas
where other objectives and interests play an important role, the
trade bias may serve to distort the final outcome of the negotiations
and tip the scales toward trade objectives at the expense of other
goals or values. In addition, the WTO may lack the professional
resources and experience required to design a regulatory regime
outside its traditional field of expertise.
5.2.2. The Mercantilist Ethos
Another potential problem with using the WTO to promote
harmonization initiatives is connected to the typical negotiation
environment of this organization. The negotiations within the WTO,
and within its predecessor the GATT, are characterized by a
mercantilist ethos 34 of give and take, where trade "concessions" in
the form of mutual obligations to lower certain trade barriers are
exchanged between nations until "a balanced outcome" has been
reached. The negotiators sometime appear to perceive themselves
as agents of their domestic industries, not of their domestic
consumers, striving to maximize their export opportunities in return
for a minimum amount of import opportunities. The achievements
of each country's negotiation team are then measured according to
the ratio of these two parameters -and not according to the extent to
which the new agreement will contribute to the general welfare of
their society. To negotiate a law-harmonization initiative aimed at
producing the best possible global regulatory regime within a
specific field in this type of polarized environment may not be
conducive to the objective, and may produce a suboptimal regime.
134 Paul Krugman, What Should Trade Negotiators Negotiate About?, 35 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 113 (1997); PEREZ, supra note 84, ch. 3.
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
5.2.3. Too Politicized Framework
Traditional law-harmonizing institutions, such as the
UNIDROIT and UNCITRAL, are usually characterized as
professional and relatively non-politicized bodies. In his account of
the work on the UNCITRAL Convention on International Sale of
Goods, Professor John Honnold, who served as the secretary of the
organization when the convention was negotiated, traces the success
of the convention to the fact that the representatives adopted "a
flexible, international approach" whereby they would not try to
bargain "in the spirit of tariff negotiations" for the maximum
number of scraps of national law, 135 but would all join in the
common effort to design the best possible international sales law.
The fact that such an agreement could be reached is no doubt also
related to the fact that none of the delegates were trade attaches or
politicians, but rather academics and legal experts who were sent to
the task because of their experience and expertise. 36 The WTO, in
contrast, is by its nature a much more politically charged forum and
has become even more so in the last few years. 37 Member States
send their trade diplomats, not academics or private experts, to the
WTO to negotiate the best possible deal for their countries. These
trade negotiators often arrive with strict instructions from their
governments and sometimes from their domestic industry, and are
concerned about what they can and cannot agree to. These
negotiators are not seeking to promote global welfare, rather to
promote their respective national interests as perceived by their
trade ministries. To let this forum negotiate a new harmonizing
regime in an important legal or socioeconomic field - such as a
global product liability convention - in the same way these
135 JOHN HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 51 (2d ed. 1991).
136 Id. (discussing UNCITRAL's representatives). Based on the UNCITRAL's
basic charter found in G.A. Res. 2205, U.N. CITRAL, 21st Sess., at 99, U.N. Doc.
A/6369 (1966), reprinted in [1968] 1 Y.B. Int'l Trade L. Comm'n 65, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/SER.A/1970.
137 See Battle in Seattle, supra note 2 (explaining that following the fierce
Seattle demonstrations, Sylvia Ostry, a former Canadian trade negotiator, recalled
nostalgically how the previous trade negotiation round had been launched in 1986
in Punta del Este, a sleepy Uruguayan seaside resort, with no TV cameras, let
alone demonstrators: "Faxes didn't arrive, and nor did our newspapers. It felt like
we were on Mars.")
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delegates negotiate tariff concessions, by tit for tat bargaining, is not
very likely to produce a high-quality legal regime.
On the other hand, one may argue that the analogy to the
UNCITRAL Convention on International Sale of Goods is not
necessarily legitimate. An international sales law that is to govern
private international transactions between sellers and buyers is a
much less contentious and controversial issue than many of the
issues that are raised within the WTO. Since each nation has both
sellers and buyers, the national interests of the representatives
would hardly be served by bargaining for pro-seller or pro-buyer
provisions or for trying to get a maximum number of scraps of
national law into the convention. In relation to most of the WTO
issues, however, where there are legitimate adverse interests of
different countries and economies in different stages of
development, one may argue that international regimes ought to be
negotiated within a polarized forum where all these interests are
represented to ensure a chance that the final outcome will represent
some type of balanced compromise between these interests.
5.2.4. The Democratic Deficit
A problem frequently raised by WTO critics is the lack of
democratic legitimacy to its legislative process. 138 It is claimed that
negotiations on the formulation of the rules are often shrouded
under a heavy veil of secrecy, conducted by unelected diplomats
negotiating, and eventually binding their governments and
legislators to rules in relation to which "the people" or its legitimate
representatives have had no real say. There has also been grave
criticism against the WTO for not allowing NGOs, who represent
various sections of society, to participate in the legislative process. 39
138 This argument was first raised in the Trade & Environment debate. See,
e.g., Patti A. Goldman, Resolving the Trade and Environment Debate: In Search of a
Neutral Forum and Neutral Principles, 49 WASH. LEE L. REV. 1279, 1285-86, 1296-98
(1992) (raising for the first time that the WTO lacks democratic legitimacy in its
legislative process); G. Richard Shell, The Trade Stakeholders Model and Participation
by Nonstate Parties in the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 359
(1996) (discussing participatory non-state parties in the WTO); see also Benvenisti,
supra note 96, at 348-58 (presenting the role of the non-governmental organization
("NGO") in the legislative process).
139 See, e.g., Steve Charnowitz, Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations
in the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 331 (1996) (discussing
the NGO's in the legislative process).
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Hence, as the mandate of the WTO is broadened and its proposed
legal instruments affect more and more areas of concern for various
interest groups-notably labour, environment, and consumer
rights -requiring Member States to change laws adopted by
democratically elected national legislators, this democratic
deficiency becomes a serious problem.
5.2.5. The Federal-State Problem
The members of the WTO are states, represented by their central
governments -not their subcentral governments, such as those of
the states in the United States and the provinces in Canada. This
may pose a problem for federal systems, where the jurisdiction in
many areas of law is vested with the subcentral legislator. In a more
specialized and less politicized framework, this problem could be
more easily addressed. For instance, each subcentral government
could send its representative to participate in the international
legislative process. In the WTO, this may prove to be impossible
due to the potential unwillingness of federal governments to cede
authority and to create a problematic precedent in relation to the
question of who runs the foreign trade policy. The GATT and the
WTO have had some experience in this regard and it has not been
entirely positive.140
6. IMPROVEMENTS TO THE "LEGISLATIVE" PROCESS OF THE WTO
In order to alleviate some of the problems described above, it
would seem desirable that when dealing with the type of
harmonization projects that have been discussed in Section 4 of this
Article, the WTO needs to adopt a different approach and a different
type of working procedure. In the paragraphs that follow, we shall
make a few suggestions on possible changes, both in the basic
philosophy of the organization and in its "legislative" process. The
latter are merely examples of amendments, which, although rather
conservative in their scope (taking into account the realpolitik of the
WTO), may nevertheless be helpful in promoting a more conducive
140 Particularly relating to the Agreement on Government Procurement,
which affects procurement by sub-central government entities as well. See, e.g.,
K.J. Cooper, To Compel or to Encourage: Seeking Compliance with International Trade
Agreements at the State Level, 2 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 143, 169 (1993) ("Recent
disputes over state-level non-tariff trade barriers, as well as negotiations on
government procurement, have reflected this dichotomy between what is legally
possible, but practically difficult.").
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and balanced environment for WTO "legislation."
6.1. Change in Outlook: The Need to Distinguish between Various
Functions of the WTO
Most of the problems described above are in essence the result of
the new role assumed by the WTO, which is very different from the
original role of the GATT as a facilitator of multilateral trade
negotiations. The GATT method of conducting negotiations and
formulating agreements was designed first and foremost with tariff
bargaining in mind, as well as for negotiations on the lowering of
other artificial trade barriers. These are typically tit for tat
negotiations, polarized and rather confrontational, in the spirit of the
mercantilist ethos. These negotiations are conducted by
representatives of central governments, mostly trade officials, since
it is they, and not subcentral governments, who usually have the
exclusive power over custom tariffs and other border measures.
Furthermore, the range of domestic interests affected is more limited
than is the case under the new broadened mandate, thus raising less
concern of democratic legitimacy.
A precondition to any solution of these problems is recognition
among Member States of the change that has occurred and of the
need to distinguish between the various functions of the WTO.
There needs to be a realization within the WTO that new initiatives
that involve new lawmaking or harmonization of domestic policies
and laws are qualitatively different from the traditional tasks of the
GATT/WT and thus require different approaches and different
negotiation techniques. One can hardly formulate and negotiate a
new international code on competition law or product liability law
in the same way that Member States have been negotiating tariff
cuts under GATT or market access in service sectors under GATT.
There is too high of a chance that such an approach will result in a
patchwork of provisions reflecting some political compromise
between opposing interests, rather than in a coherent and logical
piece of legislation. There are enough examples of WTO texts of
such incoherent outcomes that eventually serve no one well.
Without a change in approach, there is a higher chance of
breakdown in the negotiations toward potential welfare-enhancing
agreements.' 4 ' By acknowledging the distinction between the
141 The various reasons for this will be discussed below and include the lack
of professional expertise within the WTO staff in many non-trade areas, and more
so among developing countries, and the "reactive devaluation" phenomenon that
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various projects of the WTO, traditional methods of negotiations
may be maintained for the traditional projects, while new methods
are developed for the new ones.
6.2. The WTO in Comparison to Other Law-harmonizing
Organizations
The WTO is often categorized as a "member-driven"
organization. 42 All decisions within the organization are taken by
its member countries, and almost always by consensus. "A
majority vote is also possible but it has never been used in the
WTO, and was extremely rare under the WTO's predecessor,
GATT." 143 Unlike many other international organizations, 4 4 the
WTO does not have an executive council composed of a subgroup
of members, with the entire membership meeting only to decide
matters that require action by all members. In the WTO, all the
councils and committees are open to all members (148 as of today).
For a new initiative to be included on the negotiations agenda for a
new round, full agreement has to be reached between all member
countries. In the course of the negotiations, as well, the initiative
lies with member countries. The Secretariat plays a relatively
minor role and only fulfills functions assigned to it by the decision
of the members. Member countries are usually the ones who
propose texts for the consideration of other members and these texts
will often be met by counterproposals and different texts by other
members. This process may sometimes lead the parties to
"compromise" on some suboptimal mishmash of provisions devoid
of coherence.
This method of international lawmaking is very different from
the way institutions such as the UNCITRAL and UNIDROIT work
when developing new conventions or other law-harmonizing
measures. Unlike the WTO Secretariat, which has no real authority
is likely to hamper the negotiations in the absence of a third-party neutral
facilitator.
142 See Common Misunderstandings, supra note 109 (describing the WTO as a
member driven organization); see also Richard Blackhurst, The Capacity of the ITO
to Fulfill Its Mandate, in THE WTO AS AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 31, 32
(Anne Krueger ed., 1998).
143 The WTO website, The WTO in Brief: Part 2, at http://www.wto.org/
english/thewto-e/whatis-e/inbrief-e/inbr02_e.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2004).
144 For example, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have
executive boards, or the UNCITRAL whose Commission is made up of 36
Member States elected by the General Assembly of the United Nations.
[Vol. 25:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol25/iss1/5
2004] WTO AS A LAW-HARMONIZING INSTITUTION 371
to initiate and formulate new proposals, in the UNIDROIT, for
instance, the Secretariat plays a central role in the initiation and
formulation of new conventions. The UNIDROIT Secretariat,
assisted by an expert in the field when necessary, draws a
preliminary comparative law report designed to ascertain the
desirability and feasibility of a specific harmonization project.
145 The
approval of the organization's Work Program, including the
undertaking of specific projects, is under the responsibility of the
Governing Council, which also is a more professional than political
body. It is composed of the President of the Institute, who is
appointed by the Italian Government (the host country of the
organization), and twenty-five elected members, typically eminent
judges, practitioners, academics and civil servants. Once the
Governing Council is satisfied that a case has been made for taking
action, it will typically ask the Secretariat to convene a study group.
The study group is traditionally chaired by a member of the
Council. It is convened for the preparation of a preliminary draft
convention or of another appropriate harmonization measure
deemed more appropriate, such as a model law. The membership
of such study groups, made up of experts sitting in their personal
capacity, is a matter for the Secretariat, which seeks to ensure as
balanced a representation as possible of the world's different legal
and economic systems and geographic regions. Only after this
preliminary instrument has been prepared does the process move
into its intergovernmental negotiation phase with the
establishment, by the Secretariat, of a committee of governmental
experts for the finalization of a draft convention that is capable of
submission for adoption to a diplomatic conference. 146 When the
Council determines that the draft convention reflects a consensus
among the States that have participated in the committee of
governmental experts and that it accordingly stands a good chance
of adoption at a diplomatic conference, the Council will transmit it
to such a conference for adoption as an international convention.
A similar approach is reflected in the working procedures of
145 See UNIDROIT Official Web Site (citing information about the
UNIDROIT's working procedures), at http://www.unidroit.org/english/
presentation/main.htm#NR8 (last visited Feb. 17, 2004).
146 Provided the measure chosen is an international convention. In the case
of an alternative measure, not suitable by virtue of its nature for transmission to a
committee of governmental experts, the Council will be called upon to authorize
its publication and dissemination by UNIDROIT in the circles for which it has
been prepared.
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the UNCITRAL.147 The UNCITRAL, which is an organ of the
United Nations ("U.N."), has a membership as of 2004 of sixty
states (elected by the General Assembly for a term of six years from
amongst Member States of the United Nations). The membership
is structured so as to represent the various geographic regions and
the principal economic and legal systems of the world. Usually,
substantive preparatory work on topics on UNCITRAL's work
program is assigned to a working group, which typically is made
up not only of government officials (usually lawyers from the
Ministries of Justice or Foreign Affairs, sometimes even high
ranking judges), but also of well-regarded academics, experts or
private sector lawyers. All Member States may send delegations to
the Working Groups, and even nonmembers may send delegations
to participate as observers. Sometimes the chairman of a working
group will serve as such in his personal capacity, and not as a
representative of his country, based on his expertise in the area.
Assisted by professional members of the UNCITRAL Secretariat,
the working group will prepare background papers and draft legal
texts, which are then submitted to the annual session of
UNCITRAL. In order to assist it with preparation of its work, the
Secretariat frequently seeks the assistance of outside experts,
conducting ad hoc consultations with individuals or convening
meetings of groups of experts in a particular field as required. In
addition, international intergovernmental and NGOs can
participate as observers. For example, the ICC and UNIDROIT
frequently have representatives attend the meetings. After a
working group has prepared a draft text of a convention, model
law or other instrument, it is submitted to UNCITRAL for
consideration. UNCITRAL, governments, and international
organizations may accompany it with an explanatory commentary
on the draft text prepared by the Secretariat in order to assist its
consideration. Generally, the draft text and the commentary, if
prepared, are circulated to governments and interested
international organizations for comment and the Secretariat may
prepare an analysis of these comments. UNCITRAL is then able to
undertake consideration of the draft text on the basis of those
documents. If the text is a draft convention, the established
practice is that UNCITRAL recommends to the U.N. General
147 The description of the working procedures of the UNCITRAL is based on
a draft booklet on the UNCITRAL prepared by its Secretariat (on file with the
author).
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Assembly that an international conference of plenipotentiaries be
convened to finalize and adopt the convention and open it for
signature. All in all, the formulation and negotiation process
within the UNCITRAL of new legislative texts may be
characterized as a professional and usually nonpolitical process,
open to participation or observation of representatives from all
interested states and sectors, and aimed at producing a text that is
capable of obtaining the widest possible approval among potential
signatories.
There are of course important differences between the nature of
the WTO and its work and that of organizations such as the
UNIDROIT and UNICTRAL. Perhaps the most important for our
purpose is the fact that the latter two have no real force of coercion,
and by transmitting a draft convention to a diplomatic conference
they do not really exert any pressure, direct or indirect, on any
country to adopt the proposed convention, to ratify it, or to ensure
its enforcement. These actions are left entirely to the discretion of
governments, and in the history of these two organizations there
are many conventions that, although brought to a diplomatic
conference, failed to attract sufficient ratification and consequently
do not bind anyone. 148 Given the need to ratify and often
incorporate into legislation the new convention into the domestic
law of each signatory, there will usually be some type of
democratic decisionmaking process before its adoption. In
contrast, while formally any new WTO instrument requires
consent by all member countries, the reality of the "Single
Undertaking" approach de facto leaves many countries no choice
but to accept, the package of agreements negotiated within a given
148 For instance, the United Nations Convention on International Bills of
Exchange and International Promissory Notes (New York, 1988) needs ten
ratifications in order to become binding, but has until now only been ratified by
three countries. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, para.
IV (F), at http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/uncitral/doc.html (last visited Feb. 29,
2004). The United Nations Convention on the Liability of Operators of Transport
Terminals in International Trade (Vienna, 1991) requires only five ratifications in
order to become binding, but has only been ratified by two countries until now.
United Nations Convention on the Liability of Operators of Transport Terminals
in International Trade (United Nations, 1994), at http://www.jud.uio.no/lm/
un.transport.terminal.operators.liability.convention.199 4 /doc.html (last visited
Feb. 29, 2004). Likewise, the UNIDROIT, Convention on Agency in the
International Sale of Goods (1983) has only been ratified by five states and will
only come into force when accepted by ten contracting states. See Covention on
Agency in the International Sale of Goods (Geneva, Feb. 17, 1983), at
http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/unidroit.agency.sog.convention.198 3 /portrait.
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round of the WTO. It is not surprising to find, therefore, much
more sensitivity and resistance among many member countries,
especially during the last few years following the experience of the
Uruguay Round, toward the introduction of any new issue onto
the negotiation agenda. This approach is also why one can hardly
expect the same type of calm and nonpoliticized atmosphere in the
WTO as in the UNIDROIT or in the UNCITRAL. Nevertheless,
much could be learned from the experience of these organizations
and the professional manner in which they develop harmonization
initiatives. In particular, once the political decision has been made
and it has been agreed by all WTO members to include a new issue
involving law-harmonization on the negotiation agenda, the
process would benefit from depoliticization and from having the
formulations of the new text entrusted to a more professional and
open procedure. To this end, much could be gained by
strengthening the role of the Secretariat and other neutral
professional bodies in the formulation and negotiation process.
6.3. The Need for a Neutral Facilitator: Applying Insights from the
Negotiation Literature
The last decade has seen a surge in the research literature on
negotiation and dispute resolution and some of it could shed light
on possible solutions to many of the problems discussed above. One
such solution is to use neutral facilitators in the negotiations that are
actively involved in preparation of background studies and in the
drafting of proposed texts, as well as in mediating between the
parties in an effort to find common ground and to reach an
agreement. There are many justifications in the literature to the
advantages of such a function.
First, there may be several tactical and strategic barriers that
preclude rational parties from reaching efficient outcomes in WNTO
style negotiations.
"Negotiators characteristically face a dilemma arising from the
inherent tension between two different goals. The first goal consists
of maximizing the joint value of the settlement-that is, the pool of
benefits or size of the 'pie' to be divided. The second goal consists of
maximizing their own share of the benefit pool - that is, the size
and attractiveness of their particular 'slice' of pie."149
149 Robert Mnookin & Lee Ross, Introduction, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT
RESOLUTION 7 (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter BARRIERS TO
CONFLICT].
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Often the strategies and tactics designed to maximize their own
share tend to stand in the way of maximizing the pool for everyone,
and may sometimes even shrink it. For instance, it may be perfectly
rational for a negotiator to engage in tough and intransigent
bargaining tactics in an effort to increase the size of his share.
However, if more than one party employs such tactics, there is a
high chance that an otherwise mutually beneficial deal may be put
in jeopardy. Thus, if the formulation of proposed texts in a
harmonization initiative is left exclusively to the parties, there is a
high chance that each party will take a maximalist stance based on
tactical considerations. Those subjected to such tactics often respond
in kind, and the net result typically is, at best, additional cost of the
negotiation process (loss of opportunity as a result of long delays)
and, at worst, the failure to reach a mutually beneficial deal. A
neutral intermediary may help to prevent such failure by fulfilling
various functions: help each party to better prepare for the
negotiations (focus on interests and explore reasonable
expectations); help with neutral fact-finding; help with evaluation of
offers and of analysis of interests; prepare more balanced proposals
aimed at promoting common mutual interests and not motivated by
strategic demands; facilitate interest-based negotiations between the
parties; and help with generating efficient compromises, if
required. 150
Secondly, there may be psychological barriers in multiparty
negotiations that may be overcome by the use of a neutral
intermediary. As has been shown in many studies on negotiation
and cognitive psychology, the fact that a certain proposal has been
offered by someone "on the other side" often leads to a "reactive
devaluation" of the proposal.' 5 ' Evidence obtained in both
labouratory and field settings indicates that a given compromise
proposal is rated less positively when proposed by an adversary
than when proposed by an apparent neutral third party. A range of
cognitive and motivational processes has been proposed to account
for this phenomenon. These processes range from the perfectly
rational tendency of negotiators to view an adversary's willingness
to offer, rather than withhold a given concession as an indication of
150 Howard Raiffa, Analytical Barriers, in BARRIERS TO CONFLIcT, supra note 149,
at 143.
151 For a discussion of the phenomenon and a review of the empirical
evidence, see Lee Ross, Reactive Devaluation in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, in
BARRIERS TO CONFLIT, supra note 149, at 27.
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the advantages that it may bring to the adversary ("They wouldn't
have offered those terms if those terms didn't advance their
interests") and not to the recipient ("They wouldn't have offered
those terms if those terms strengthened our position relative to
theirs"), 152 to various cognitive biases, such as those documented by
Kahneman and Tversky (for instance, the one termed "loss
aversion," whereby the aversiveness of a given loss tends to be
greater than the attractiveness of a gain of the same objective
magnitude). 53 These findings fit in well with the suspicious
atmosphere that has evolved over the last few years within the WTO
negotiation rounds, particularly in relation to the new
harmonization projects, and they provide strong support to our
argument that such projects will be better served by having a neutral
and professional third party mediator or facilitator involved.
Thus, when dealing with harmonization projects a greater role
needs to be given to professional, impartial bodies whose aim and
mandate will be to serve the general, multilateral interest, and not
the interest of one member state, or of a specific group of Member
States. As is now the practice in the WTO, an official representative
of one of the WTO members, a trade diplomat who is usually
expected to serve the interest of his own country, could never fulfill
such a function, even if temporarily appointed "Chair" or "Friend of
the Chair" to facilitate certain negotiations -as is now the practice in
the WTO. 154 The facilitators have to be perceived by the negotiators
as completely impartial and independent from any of the states
involved in the negotiations. The authority and influence of such
152 Id. at 30.
153 Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIsT 341, 342 (Apr. 1984). According to their findings, the very act of
framing a proposal in a manner that invites the other side to give up some things
it values in order to receive some other things it also values (as usually is the case
in WTO negotiations) may leave the recipients of the proposal convinced that the
loss in question will not be commensurate with the gain even when a prior
elicitation of the recipients' values might have led one to anticipate that the
proposed trade of concessions would be welcomed quite eagerly.
154 For instance, in the Canciln Ministerial, the draft ministerial text was first
proposed by Ambassador Carlos Prez del Castillo, a Uruguayan trade diplomat,
who served as the Chair of the General Council. The whole meeting was presided
by Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs, Luis Ernesto Derbez, who appointed
facilitators from among the representatives of various Member States: the
representative of Singapore as the facilitator of agriculture negotiations; the
representative of Hong Kong as the facilitator of industrial market access; and the
representative of Argentina as the facilitator of the so-called "Singapore" issues
including law-harmonizing projects.
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intermediary bodies would be conditioned upon them managing to
establish and maintain their reputation of being professional and
impartial in the eyes of the Member States, and to do so would thus
be in their utmost interest. Their proposals and drafts would have
to be capable of gaining the acceptance of all member countries, or at
least the vast majority of them, in order to be successful, and this too
would induce thoughtful consensus building and a higher quality of
outcomes.
6.4. Strengthening the Role of the Secretariat
Improving the legislative process of the WTO would also
require a greater role for the WTO Secretariat. 55 Until now,
member countries - in particular the larger countries - have made
sure to keep the role of the WTO Secretariat as minimal as possible
in the negotiation process, 5 6 emphasizing the WTO as a "member
driven" organization, as noted above. This system has naturally
served the interests of those countries with stronger capacities and
larger delegations to the organization in Geneva, who have the
ability to promote new initiatives. Indeed, as has been shown by
Blackhurst, 157  compared to other international economic
organizations, the WTO Secretariat is very small in size and limited
in its powers. While this model may have been appropriate for
conventional negotiations on trade concessions, it is not conducive
to optimal results in "new issues" negotiations aimed at achieving
harmonization of domestic laws and policies. In such negotiations,
the Secretariat ought to be empowered to undertake background
studies, make proposals, and draw up draft texts for the
consideration of member countries. For this purpose, the
Secretariat ought to be authorized to employ the services of outside
experts, such as academics, to assist it in its tasks.
155 See Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization, art. VI para. 5 (stressing this character of the Director-General and
the Secretariat: "The responsibilities of the Director-General and of the staff shall
be exclusively international in character. In the discharge of their duties they shall
not seek or recieve instructions from any government or from any authority
external to the Organization."), available at http://www.unesco.org/comnat/azer
baidjan/eng/about/constitution.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2004).
156 See Blackhurst, supra note 142, at 41.
157 Id.
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6.5. A Permanent Council of Experts
One could also suggest the establishment of a Permanent
Council of Experts ("Council") composed of 10-12 independent and
distinguished experts in law, economics and international trade. 5 8
This Council would be authorized to consult the WTO and its
Member States in relation to new harmonization initiatives- i.e., in
all of the "new" issues proposed for new negotiation rounds, to
propose such new initiatives, to commission and comment on
background studies on such initiatives, and to prepare legal texts for
the consideration of Member States. The Council should be
authorized to hold public hearings on any new initiatives, where it
would invite all parties with an interest in the issue at hand,
including NGOs and subcentral governments, to make
presentations and submit briefs and opinions. By establishing such
a function, the WTO would make it clear that harmonization
initiatives are materially different from other types of multilateral
trade negotiations, and should therefore be approached in a more
professional and less politicized manner, while simultaneously
ensuring that all interested parties and all relevant perspectives on
the issue are heard and considered. The Council could also propose
tailor-made mechanisms whereby negotiations and drafting in
specific areas should be made.
At the same time, however, the Member States would not be
bound by the Council's proposals, and would maintain their
sovereign right to oppose the proposals, to modify them, or to make
alternative proposals. At the end of the day, it would have to be the
Member States that came to an agreement whether or not to adopt a
proposal, and if so to what extent. However, the fact that the
process was initiated and accompanied by an independent
professional body would lend it more authority and credibility. It
would thus contribute significantly to alleviate some of the
problems discussed above and to ensure a better product at the end
158 A certain precedent to such an institution, however much more restricted
in its mandate, can be found in the WTO Agreement on Subsidies. See 1994
Subsidies Agreement, supra note 33. Article 24.3 of this agreement provides for
the establishment of a Permanent Group of Experts ("Group"), composed of five
independent persons, highly qualified in the fields of subsidies, and trade
relations. The Group may be requested to assist a dispute settlement panel with
regards to the question whether a measure that has been referred to the panel is a
Prohibited Subsidy pursuant to the Agreement. Id. art. 24.3. Article 4.5 of the
Agreement provides that the Group's conclusion on the issue must be accepted by
the panel without modifications. Id. art. 4.5.
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of the process. It may also ensure that the interests of the
developing and least developed countries would be considered
more seriously, in view of the fact that under the existing system
their lack of expertise in the complex issues on the WTO agenda
considerably undermines their ability to look after their own
interests.
6.6. Cooperation with other International Organizations
Finally, it would seem advisable that when dealing with issues
that are within the mandate of other international organizations, or
adjoined to their respective mandates, the WTO should cooperate
with those institutions in order to take advantage of their experience
and expertise, as well as of their institutional structure which may be
more suitable to facilitate work in this specific field than that of the
WTO. These institutions may have already created internationally
agreed texts on the subject at hand, which could be adopted or
referred to by the WTO agreement. Such texts (conventions, model
laws, declarations, and so forth) would have a greater chance of
being balanced, unbiased and of a higher-quality than texts
negotiated within the traditional WTO atmosphere.
Thus, for instance, when dealing with the issue of trade and
labour, the WTO ought to strengthen its cooperation with the ILO
and make reference- to the extent that this will be agreed by WTO
Member States -to internationally recognized ILO conventions on
core labour standards. By such cooperation, the WNTO would also
take advantage of the ILO's tripartite structure, which allows not
only the active participation of governments in the decision-making
process, but of employers and workers as well. Likewise, in the
proposed initiative on regulating government procurement
procedures15 9 the WTO ought to take advantage of the Model Law
developed by UNCITRAL1 60 and of the experience with its
implementation in developing countries, and use this Model Law as
the basis for its proposed text in this field. Finally, in a possible
initiative to negotiate a global consumer protection code, the WNTO
could use the U.N. General Assembly Resolution on Consumer
159 See discussion supra Section 4.1.1.
160 See UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of Goods, supra note 130
(developing laws on good procurement).
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Protection. 161
7. CONCLUSION AND DISCLAIMER
The objective of this Article has been to draw attention to a
somewhat neglected aspect of the World Trade Organization -its
law-harmonizing function. As has been shown, this is a function
that has evolved gradually, in particular during the last two
negotiation rounds, and in stark contrast to a previous official
policy of non-intervention with Member countries' domestic
policies. The main causes of this transformation are the wish to
eliminate obstacles to international commerce, caused by differences
in national laws and regulations, and the desire to equalize terms of
competition and "level the playing field." Based on these rationales,
the Article has suggested several other areas where potential exists
for law-harmonization by the WTO, some of which are already
being discussed as possible items on the ongoing Doha
Development Agenda, and others which have not yet been
proposed but which we may perhaps find on future agendas. The
rationales and potential for these various harmonization initiatives
were discussed, as well as the realistic expectations in this regard
in view of precedents from other international frameworks. The
Article then discussed the relative advantages and disadvantages
of the WTO, in relation to traditional law-harmonizing institutions,
such as the UNIDROIT and UNCITRAL, concluding that its
advantage lies in its ability to offer a wide array of bargaining
opportunities-including "cross-section" bargains-that may allow
consensus building between very different economies, as well as in
its strong enforcement mechanism.
There are, however, many problems with harmonization within
the WTO framework, some of which stem from the structural
characteristics of the organization, and others from its political and
ideological orientation. The Article outlined some of these
problems, and then proposed several improvements to the
"legislative" process of the WTO aimed at making it more apt for its
new role as a law-harmonizing institution. A precondition for any
change in this regard is an understanding among WTO members of
the need to distinguish between the various functions of the WTO
161 G.A. Res. 248, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/248 (1995),
reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 914 (1985). See Patrizio Merciai, Consumer Protection and the
United Nations, 20 J. WORLD TRADE 206 (1986).
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and a realization that harmonization of domestic policies and laws
are qualitatively different from the traditional tasks of the
GATT/WTO and thus require different approaches and different
negotiation techniques. These approaches and techniques can be
learned from the practice of traditional law-harmonizing
institutions. Thus, one of the suggested changes is to employ the
good services of a neutral facilitator or intermediary. This may
include the establishment of a new professional and impartial body
within the WTO whose aim and mandate will be to serve the
general, multilateral interest of the WTO and its members, the
strengthening of the role of the WTO Secretariat, and the
establishment of a permanent council of experts. It is also
recommended that the WTO strengthen its cooperation with other
international organizations that have been involved in relevant
harmonization initiatives, in order to take advantage of their
experience and expertise, as well as their institutional structure
which may be more suitable to facilitate work in this specific field
than that of the WTO.
However, even if these improvements are made -and even
more so if not- it is not certain that the WTO in its present situation,
or in the near future, is capable of undertaking any new
harmonization projects. In the strength of the WTO - its wide
spectrum of subject matters, its large membership and its strong
enforcement mechanism-lies also its weakness. During the last
few years, and in particular after the recent failed Cancdn
Ministerial, the organization appears to be bogged down by the
deep disagreements on the traditional trade issues, in particular
agriculture. The developed countries' unreasonable refusal to do
away with their huge agricultural subsidies and high textile tariffs
has caused resentment among the developing countries and a
refusal on their part to consider any of the "new issues," which in
essence are harmonization projects (in particular competition and
government procurement). With a consensus-based system and a
growing membership (currently 148 countries), it will become
harder to reach agreements on these contentious issues, and the
introduction of yet additional issues may be unwise. Perhaps the
faltering WTO is suffering from an overload of projects. If the
multilateral system collapses, many of the rich countries are likely to
turn to alternative venues, namely bilateral and regional trade
agreements, and many of the harmonization projects may be
pursued within such frameworks.
On the other hand, the world has much to lose from a collapse of
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the multilateral system, especially the poor countries that are not
connected to any of the regional groupings of the major trading
blocks. There is still a common interest in the revival of the Doha
negotiation round, despite the many obstacles, and the fact is that
many of the previous successful negotiation rounds also went
through several crises until the eventual agreement was reached.
For the developed countries to agree to abandon their heavy
protection of domestic farms, they need to be offered something
significant in return. At least some of the "new issues" are likely to
be part of a package deal that may break the current impasse.
As for some of the other possible harmonization projects,
which may become relevant only in the more distant future,
serious thought has to be given to whether the WTO is the proper
forum for negotiating such projects, in view of its various
advantages and disadvantages discussed above and considering
whether the required amendments to its legislative process have
been made. One must also remember that the WNTO, after all, is an
organization devoted to international trade, and while it is clearly
the case that many types of domestic policies may have some
indirect effect on trade and on the comparative advantage of a
country, the "trade-relatedness" of some of the newly and not yet
proposed harmonization projects is sometimes weak. Serious
thought will also have to be given on the desirability of each such
harmonization project, weighing its many advantages against its
disadvantages, a separate question, which has not been discussed
exhaustively in this Article.162
162 As was pointed out above, this Article has not attempted to evaluate the
normative case for, or against, harmonization of law per se or in connection with
each specific project. Rather, we started from the conclusion reached above that
harmonization has taken place within the WTO, and that there is a good chance that
the organization will continue to play an important role in this field. While we have
occasionally described several benefits of possible harmonization projects, this does
not amount to an exhaustive normative analysis. Rather, the emphasis of this
Article has been on the institutional aspects of harmonization within the WTO in
contrast to other organizations.
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